

Representation of Dutch Domestic Stakeholders' Interests in European Union
Environmental Policy
*An in-depth Analysis of the Process and Outcome of Interest Representation on the
National and European level*

Author	M.R. (Mike) Freeze
Contact	mikefreeze@live.nl
Student number	1123440
Date	June 3, 2015
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Master's program	Public Administration. Public Management: Between Politics and Policy
University	Leiden University – Campus The Hague
Supervisor	dr. S.N. (Sarah) Giest
Second reader	dr. B.J. (Brendan) Carroll

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Preface

In my Bachelor's thesis I examined to what extent the perceived dichotomy between the developed and developing countries explains the deadlock in the global environmental negotiations (Freeze, 2014). According to the existing scientific literature, northern and southern countries have conflicting perceptions of how responsibility between countries should be allocated (Gupta, 2012: 640; Audet, 2013: 371). These countries have different interpretations of a fair share (Zhang and Shi, 2014: 67; Harris and Symons, 2013: 20; Parks and Roberts, 2008: 624). This is to a great extent caused by the different economic and political power positions countries occupy (Parks and Roberts, 2008: 624).

I concluded on the contrary that countries do have a common perception and shared interests in global environmental decision-making. This explains why the developed and developing countries, despite their differences, often reach a judicial binding agreement which contains concrete, detailed and unequivocal measures for both the northern and southern countries to diminish their amount of emission of greenhouse gases (Freeze, 2014: 31).

I was very interested in to what extent actors on another level of governance also have a common perception of and shared interests in environmental policy. I wondered to what extent fossil fuel oriented and renewable energy oriented domestic stakeholders share similar and different perceptions of the European Union environmental policy- and decision-making process. Therefore this is the focus of this research. This inquiry examines the degree to which the interests of Dutch domestic business and diffuse environmental policy stakeholders have been represented by the Dutch national government and the EU in European Union environmental policy. The result of this research is thesis. I hope you enjoy reading it and benefit from taking note of the findings of this inquiry.

Mike Freeze

Leiden, June 3, 2015

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List of abbreviations

CO ₂	Carbon dioxide
CH ₄	Methane
ETS	Emissions Trading System
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
N ₂ O	Nitrous oxide

1. Introduction

Nowadays the climate is changing worldwide as a consequence of the increased emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. The increased amount of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O) in the atmosphere has led to a raise in the general surface temperature. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)¹ states that it is likely that at the end of the 21st century the global average temperature rises with 0.4 to 4.8 degrees compared to the period 1986-2005 (2013: 20). Furthermore, ‘the contrast in precipitation between wet and dry regions and between wet and dry seasons will increase’ in general (IPCC, 2013: 20). Moreover, the sea level likely continues to rise for the period 2081-2100 with 26 to 28 centimetres compared to the period 1986-2005 (IPCC, 2013: 25). Further warming occurs if greenhouse gases continue to be emitted and because of this all components of the climate system will change (IPCC, 2013: 19). Greenhouse gases have to be substantially and sustainably reduced to limit climate change (IPCC, 2013: 19).

To mitigate² this observed climate change the Dutch government and the European Union (EU) decide upon environmental policy. In 2014 the European Council decided that the EU must reduce its domestic emissions of greenhouse gases by 2030 with 40 percent compared to 1990 (European Council, 2014: 1). In 2013 the Dutch cabinet, trade unions, employers’ organizations, environmental and some business interest groups signed an energy agreement for sustainable growth. They coincided that in 2020 14 percent and in 2023 16 percent of the energy provision should be renewable. They aim to reduce the CO₂-emission with 80 percent till 95 percent by 2050 (Socio-Economic Council, 2013: 5-9).

Agreeing with the many stakeholders upon energy policy to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases and increase the amount of renewable energy is not an easy task. Some environmental interest organizations want to increase the amount of renewable energy and decrease the amount of fossil fuels on the short-term. On the other hand, energy intensive business interest groups invest in fossil fuels and therefore do not prefer significant and expensive short-term reductions in fossil fuels production and use. These contradicting policy positions have explicit consequences for the degree of the representation of domestic

¹ The IPCC is a scientific body that operates under the auspices of the United Nations in which thousands of voluntary scientists from all over the world are united to assess the state of the climate by reviewing the existing climate literature.

² The related concepts of mitigation and adaptation are often used in climate change discussions. Mitigation regards limiting or stopping change in the earth’s climate. Adaption refers to taking measures to limit or stop the impact of this climate change on the earth’s ecosystems.

stakeholders' interests by governments. For example, representing diffuse interests has proven to be problematic in the European Union (Pollack, 1997: 572).

The Netherlands has a large diversity in environmental policy stakeholders. Some Dutch energy intensive oriented business stakeholders like for example Shell and Tata Steel invest many resources in and are highly dependent on fossil fuels. More environmental oriented Dutch business groups like for example biofuel, solar and wind energy companies and Dutch environmental interest groups like for example Greenpeace and Natuur & Milieu shift their attention and resources to increasing the amount of renewable energy. These energy intensive business on the one hand and the more environmental oriented business and environmental domestic stakeholders on the other hand have opposing interests in European Union environmental policy.

For example, ambitious EU environmental policy could be directed towards reducing the use of fossil fuels and increase the amount of renewable energy in the Netherlands. This can bring extra costs for fossil fuel oriented companies like Shell and Tata Steel and as a consequence threaten their international competitive position. On the other hand, such an ambitious environmental policy could contain financial subsidies to renewable energy oriented stakeholders like biofuel, solar and wind energy producing companies that contribute to realising these CO₂- and renewable energy targets. As a consequence this could strengthen their international competitive position.

The Dutch government and the European Union are concerned with protecting the overall Dutch and EU interest. Consequently, it is especially difficult to represent the interests of both the fossil fuel and renewable energy oriented Dutch domestic environmental stakeholders. This task becomes even more complicated because the Dutch government not only has to deal with a loss of power at the European level, but also has to cope with the growing power of domestic stakeholders that try to influence EU policy decisions (Verbeek and Van der Vleuten, 2008: 357). Therefore, this inquiry analyses to what extent the Dutch government and the EU have represented the interests of Dutch domestic stakeholders in EU environmental policy. This research also focuses on how the Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders themselves perceive to what extent their interests have been represented.

1.1 Research question

This inquiry analyses the process and outcome of the representation of Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests from the (sub)national to the European level in European Union

environmental policy. As it has not received much scientific attention and it is practically very relevant, this inquiry examines this issue by trying to answer the following research question:

To what extent have Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests been represented by the Dutch national government and the European Union in the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy?

1.2 Theoretical relevance

The European Union has obtained more and more policy competences (Börzel and Panke, 2013: 117). Consequently, the EU has more and more influence on the behaviour of actors in Europe. To analyse to what extent the EU represents its stakeholders' interests, many authors have written about interest representation in the EU (Dessai and Michaelowa, 2001; Wilts and Quittkat, 2003; Grossman, 2004; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008; Beyers and Kerremans, 2012; Eising and Lehringer, 2013). However, as a result of the growing amount and diversity of the policy fields of the European Union more research is required to explain interest representation in the wide variety of EU policy. This also holds for EU environmental policy.

In explaining the difficulties for realizing environmental agreements authors focus on the presence of diffuse interest groups (Levy, 1997: 66; Bryner, 2008: 320). These interest groups influence the policy-making as well as the policy-implementation process and outcome. Regarding environmental policy-making, authors explain the formulation of governmental positions and strategies in international negotiations by the influence of domestic interest groups (Bailer, 2012: 535; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994: 78). Business considerations are found to be dominant in formulating such a government's negotiation position (Levy, 1997: 64).

However, the current literature is not much directed towards explaining why the national government and the EU represent domestic environmental policy stakeholders' interests to a certain degree. The theoretical relevance therefore lies in refining the explanations of why the national government and the European Union represent the interests of Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders to a certain extent. To achieve this, this research tries to shed insight into similarities and differences in the explanations for the degree of representation of the interests of fossil fuel oriented and renewable energy oriented stakeholders by the national government and EU.

1.3 Societal relevance

Few inquiries are directed towards analysing to what extent domestic environmental policy stakeholders' interests have been represented by the national government and the EU. Research is even less directed towards examining how domestic interest groups and stakeholders perceive that the national government and the European Union have represented their interests in EU environmental policy. However, these are relevant questions, because governments are expected to represent the general interest for their citizens. Analysing this and making these findings public might contribute to holding the national government and the EU accountable for how they represent Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests in European environmental policy- and decision-making.

Furthermore, environmental debates nowadays largely explain the difficulties in agreeing on national emission reduction targets by focusing on the inability of countries to internationally reach an agreement (Harrison and Kostka, 2014: 450). However, the importance of realizing domestic support and capacity that are needed to mitigate climate change is underestimated (Harrison and Kostka, 2014: 451). Activities of interest groups can make domestic climate action difficult to carry out (Dessai and Michaelowa, 2001: 339). The success or failure of environmental policy depends upon the extent to which the domestic energy intensive and renewable energy oriented interest groups comply with governmental environmental policy.

Domestic stakeholders for a large part execute the climate mitigation measures decided upon by their national government. They therefore facilitate or prevent effective implementation of the governmental environmental policy. If domestic groups feel their interests are sufficiently represented, they will probably contribute to implementing governmental environmental policy and achieving the environmental targets. On the other hand, if domestic stakeholders perceive their interests are insufficiently represented by the national government, they can choose to try to hinder the implementation of governmental environmental policy and not to contribute to the environmental policy targets.

The societal relevance therefore also lies in explaining how and why the Dutch national government and the European Union have represented Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders' interests to a certain degree. These findings can be used to better represent domestic stakeholders' positions during new European Union environmental negotiations. This facilitates the implementation process of environmental policy and contributes to some extent to enhancing the mitigation of climate change. Additionally, better

representation of domestic stakeholders' interests might improve a national government's legitimacy.

1.4 Thesis outline

This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two reviews the current scientific literature regarding the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests by the national government and the European Union in EU (environmental) policy- and decision-making. Chapter three presents the methodology of this research to examine to what extent Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests have been represented by the Dutch national government and the EU in the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. Chapter four describes the European Commission (EC) policy proposal, the Dutch government's standpoint and the final decision regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. Chapter five sets out the information this inquiry obtained regarding the Dutch domestic stakeholders' and the Dutch government's lobbying activities, policy positions and perceptions of the process and outcome of interest representation. Chapter six analyses the process and outcome of representing the Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests in the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. Chapter seven recapitulates the major findings of this research, discusses the implications of this inquiry and suggests possibilities for further research.

2. Literature review

The degree to which the national government and the European Union represent domestic stakeholders' interests in EU policy- and decision-making might have consequences for the legitimacy of these institutions. If EU policy decisions structurally do not sufficiently represent a national government's standpoint, this regime might become against further European integration. Similarly, if EU policy decisions continuously do not represent domestic stakeholders' interests, domestic support for further EU integration could decline. Additionally, domestic stakeholders might lose trust in the ability of their national government to represent their interests. Dissatisfaction from domestic stakeholders with how their interests are represented by the national government at the EU level could cause implementation and enforcement problems of EU regulations and directives. This might especially occur in the environmental policy field, where to some extent a dichotomy exists of domestic stakeholders that nowadays are more fossil fuel and renewable energy oriented.

This chapter provides an overview of the current literature on the representation of (domestic) interest groups in European Union (environmental) policy- and decision-making. It is organized as follows. This chapter firstly discusses the current literature on European integration, Europeanization of policy- and decision-making and the process of European Union policy- and decision-making. Then two major theories (intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance) that explain this process of European integration and policy- and decision-making are discussed. The following passages focus on the role of and access points for interest groups in the EU policy process, differences between concentrated and diffuse interest groups herein and their role in environmental policy- and decision-making. The next section pays attention to determinants of lobbying success for these interest groups. Finally, the end of this chapter identifies gaps in the current literature and explains how this research can contribute to some extent to filling this theoretical gap.

2.1 European integration

European integration has had major impacts on the national political and policy context of EU member states. It has caused a shift of power and authority from national governments to the EU (Schmidt, 2006: 2). Moreover, the European Union has 'de-politicized' national politics, because national partisan positions play a less important role at the EU-level and more policies shift from the national to the European level (Schmidt, 2006: 156). This can have and probably has important consequences for the process of domestic interest representation by EU member states.

The uniting of European states into a larger supranational federation and the development of the European Union has by many authors been characterized as a process of Europeanization. It is regarded as a process that analyses the interplay between the EU and its member states (Börzel and Panke, 2013: 116). Many different definitions exist. Schmidt for example adopts a rather broad definition, as she characterises Europeanization as ‘the process of building a more ‘democratic’ European public sphere’ (2006: 1). Contrary, Benson and Jordan take a more narrow view as they regard Europeanization as a process in which the European Union affects domestic systems (Benson and Jordan, 2013: 331). Versluis e.a. take a more all-inclusive approach as they define Europeanization as how member states influence, adapt to and change their structures in accordance with the EU (2011: 171).

Overall, the one Europeanization research strand inquires ‘how member states shape EU policies, politics and polity, while the other focuses on how the EU triggers domestic change’ (Börzel and Panke, 2013: 116). A differentiation can thus be made between a bottom-up and a top-down perspective. The top-down approach explains domestic change by focusing on causes at the European Union level (Börzel and Panke, 2013: 116). The bottom-up perspective explains how member states and other domestic actors affect European Union policies, politics and polity (Börzel and Panke, 2013: 116). The latter does not receive enough scientific attention as Europeanization clearly is a multidirectional process (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008: 1162).

Interest groups contribute to this process of European integration (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008: 1162). Europeanization can thus also refer to the interest representation activities of these interest groups. In this context, Europeanization captures the degree to which domestic interest groups recognize the impact of the EU and direct themselves to the European level to make their domestic interests known (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007: 461; Klüver, 2010: 176). National interest groups thus not only download European Union policies but also upload their policy preferences to the European level (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008: 1150).

The EU-policies affect many domestic interest groups (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). Accordingly, they have to figure out how they represent their interests on different levels of governance (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). Secondly, it is difficult for diffuse interest groups to be active in both the European and national arena (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). Thirdly, how well interest groups are embedded in the national context has an impact on whether they act on the European or domestic level (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). Fourthly, it is unclear to what extent the European Union influences the relationship

between domestic actors and domestic institutions (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). Fifthly, the growing importance of EU policy might cause domestic interest groups to redefine their interests (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). Finally, it is unclear to what extent European integration strengthens the influence of state institutions or domestic interest groups (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 193). This inquiry supports a multidirectional approach, recognizing that both member states and interest groups influence the EU and the EU affects its member states and domestic stakeholders. Distinguished European Union decision-making procedures (ordinary legislative and special legislative procedures) exist through which this process of interest representation takes place.

The ordinary legislative procedure covers the majority of EU policy-making processes (Versluis e.a., 2011: 49). The European Commission initiates a policy proposal (that can come from different European Union institutions, member states or certain interest groups) ((Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2013: 204-205; Versluis e.a., 2011: 49-50). The European Commission establishes a working group with relevant stakeholders (member states' civil servants and representatives interest groups) in order to determine the current state of knowledge and ideas regarding the policy topic (Versluis e.a., 2011: 50). Once the Commission has worked out the proposal, it goes to the advisory bodies for advice (when required) and to the European Parliament and the Council for Ministers for decision (Versluis e.a., 2011: 50; Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2013: 206).

The special legislative procedures concern policy decisions in areas where member-states want to have full control (Versluis e.a., 2011: 51-52). Two decision-making procedures exist. The consent procedure requires that the European Parliament agrees with the decision before it can be adopted by the Council (Versluis e.a., 2011: 52). In the consultation procedure the European Parliament can give its non-binding opinion (and suggest amendments) on a proposal (Versluis e.a., 2011: 52). The Council decides on the policy outcome after hearing the European Parliament (Versluis e.a., 2011: 52).

These new processes of policy- and decision-making have led to legitimacy problems for member states and the European Union as a whole. Member states have not adapted the traditional workings of their democracies to the new decision-making governance structure (Schmidt, 2006: 1). Consequently, they suffer from a democratic deficit (Schmidt, 2006:1). National governments do not acknowledge enough that Europeanization meant a loss of control and influence for the national government (Schmidt, 2006: 3). Member states have 'politics without policy' (Schmidt, 2006: 5). Many policies are shifted from the national to the European level, for which citizens do not have much direct control and have only national

politicians to hold to account for (Schmidt, 2006: 5). The democratic deficit then is that the public holds the national government accountable ‘for policies for which they are not fully responsible, over which they may not have much control and to which they may not even be politically committed’ (Schmidt, 2006: 3).

The multi-level governance structure of the European Union has also turned out to be problematic for the EU itself. The European democratic deficit means that the EU had obtained increased decision-making powers, but had not designed sufficient democratic control (Smismans, 2013: 342). National governments (rather than national parliaments) debated and decided in the Council on policy issues, whereas the European Parliament did not have the power to ensure democratic accountability at the European level (Smismans, 2013: 343). The EU thus suffers from ‘policy without politics’ (Schmidt, 2006: 5). It does not have enough ‘participation by and representation of the people’ (Schmidt, 2006: 29). Partisan politics do not play a major role within the European Union because European political parties are weak and there is ‘no EU government with the political authority and legitimacy derived from EU-wide elections’ (Schmidt, 2006: 158). Before examining the relationship between the EU institutions, its member states and domestic interest groups in more detail, the following sections elaborate upon the two theories (intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance) that are most important in explaining (these problems of) European integration and policy- and decision-making.

2.1.1 Intergovernmentalism

The European Union can be seen as an intergovernmental regime (Moravcsik, 1993: 474). This means that states remain the ultimate decision-makers and delegate limited authority to supranational institutions (Hoffmann, 1966: 909; Marks e.a., 1996: 343-345; Moravcsik, 1993: 518; Cini and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, 2013: 397). The process of European integration preserves or even enhances the autonomy of EU member states (Marks e.a., 1996: 342). Namely, European integration is driven by negotiations among member states (Marks e.a., 1996: 342; Moravcsik, 1991: 25). State sovereignty is protected because the extent of integration depends on the acceptability to all member states (Marks e.a., 1996: 342). Important issues are decided upon with unanimity, which ensures that policy outcomes reflect member states’ interests and member states do not have to incorporate policies they do not support (Marks e.a., 1996: 345).

Supranational institutions evolve to facilitate the negotiation process among member states (Marks e.a., 1996: 342). These supranational actors have limited authority and are

designed to help achieving the policy goals of member states (Marks e.a., 1996: 345; Hoffmann, 1982: 21). According to intergovernmentalism, these supranational actors only gain increased powers from national governments insofar as they strengthen national governments' control over domestic interests (Moravcsik, 1993: 507; Pollack, 2001: 226). Member states' preferences in the European negotiations are determined by domestic interests (Moravcsik, 1991: 25; Pollack, 2001: 225; Van Keulen, 2006: 26). These domestic interests are solely represented by national governments in European negotiations (Marks e.a., 1996: 345). Intergovernmentalism thus sees EU member states as the central power-possessing actors in European decision-making and as the channels for the representation of national interests on the European level.

Intergovernmentalism has been criticized for a couple of reasons. A first criticism is 'that it simply does not fit the facts' (Cini, 2013: 80). Intergovernmentalism focuses too much on negotiations between states over major European Community issues (Wincott, 1995: 602). Intergovernmentalism may explain major decisions resulting from member state negotiations, but is less able to explain EU policy- and decision-making on minor policy decisions where majority voting applies (Cini, 2013: 81). A second criticism is that intergovernmentalism should pay more attention to domestic politics in order to explain the formation of governmental positions (Cini, 2013: 81). National preference formation is not only determined by economic interests, but also by other factors like domestic structures (Cini, 2013: 81).

A third criticism is that intergovernmentalism does not pay enough attention to the influence and constraints policymakers could face from supranational actors to achieve certain policy outcomes (Pollack, 2001: 226; Cini, 2013: 81). For example, supranational actors like the European Commission can and do use opportunities to pursue their own interests (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998: 311-312; Wettstad, 2009: 325). A fourth criticism is that member states' preferences are not only determined by domestic preferences because member states' positions are also influenced by European Union membership (Pollack, 2001: 226). Finally some scholars reject intergovernmentalism completely and argue for a different type of European integration theory: multi-level governance (Marks e.a., 1996) (Pollack, 2001: 227).

2.1.2 Multi-level governance

Contrary to intergovernmentalism, multi-level governance theory argues that states no longer monopolize but share European policy-making with actors at different levels (Marks e.a.,

1996: 346; Christiansen, 2013: 107; Van Keulen, 2006: 36). States have lost authority upward, downward and sideways (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 233; Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001: 500). Consequently, governance has become multi-level (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 233). States no longer monopolize the representation of domestic interests in European negotiations (Marks e.a., 1996: 346-347; Christiansen, 2013: 107). European member states become less important in representing domestic interests in international relations (Marks e.a., 1996: 341).

Supranational institutions as the European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice can and do influence the European policy-making process without necessarily fulfilling all member states' goals (Marks e.a., 1996: 346). For example, the European Commission and the European Parliament use interest groups as allies in power struggles with European Union member states to favour certain policy positions (Saurugger, 2008: 1281). These supranational institutions have weakened member state sovereignty because of their autonomous role in European policy- and decision-making (Marks e.a., 1996: 341-342). Moreover, the collective decision-making procedures and processes on many policy issues cause that states are enforced to incorporate policy decisions they do not always agree with (Marks e.a., 1996: 346).

Multi-level governance has provided opportunities for interest groups to get their interests represented. Domestic actors operate both on the national and the European level (Marks e.a., 1996: 346; Christiansen, 2013: 107). When national opportunities decrease, interest groups could shift their attention to the European level (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008: 551; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2008: 1267). At the national level, these domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups (Putnam, 1988: 434). At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures (Putnam, 1988: 434). Their negotiation success depends on the extent to which the constellation of domestic interests and preferences turns out to be acceptable at the international negotiation table (Haverland and Liefferink, 2012: 181).

The theory of multi-level governance has also been criticised. Two authors point to limitations of its conception regarding the state-system. Multi-level governance does not pay enough attention to the problems associated with placing territorial boundaries at the centre of explaining governance (Faludi, 2012: 207). Namely, the European Union cannot be solely explained in terms of territorial governance structures (Murphy, 2008: 16). Furthermore, multi-level governance is ambiguous (Faludi, 2012: 207). It often focuses on vertical relationships between actors within a multi-level system and not on the construct of

governance (Faludi, 2012: 207). Table one provides an overview of the main characteristics of these two theories of intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance.

Table one: Intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance theory compared (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001: 500).

	Intergovernmentalism	Multi-level governance
View of the integration process	States are the ultimate decision-makers; integration does not challenge their autonomy	States remain pre-eminent, but share power with other actors
State sovereignty	Preserved and often strengthened by integration	At best preserved by the integration process; at worst diluted by it
Policy outcomes	Approximate to the lowest common denominator of state preferences	Lowest common denominator outcomes in a small subset of decisions
Role of supranational bodies	Assist states by improving the credibility of state commitments	Have significant autonomy and their own independent conceptions of integration
Levels of governance	Discrete: state ‘keeps’ the gate between supranational and subnational actors	Interconnected: states no longer monopolise the links between supranational and subnational levels
Subnational actors	Mobilization largely controlled by states that function as the sole intermediary with the EU	Mobilize independently and directly; use the EU to outflank states into accepting deeper integration

Figure one visualises how the theories of intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance view the representation of domestic interests by the national government and the European Union in EU policy- and decision-making.




Figure one: Interest representation in EU policy- and decision-making explained by intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance theory (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001: 501).

2.2 Interest groups in European Union governance

The perceived multi-level governance structure of the European Union provides interest groups with multiple possibilities to represent their interests. Consequently, actors that try to influence the policy decision characterize the EU decision-making process (Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2013: 204). These stakeholders try to change the decision-making process in the direction they favour (Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg, 2013: 204). This process of lobbying can be seen as an exchange relationship between actors that depend on each other (Klüver, 2013: 73). This section describes these possibilities for interest groups to influence EU policy- and decision-making.

2.2.1 Access points

Access of interest groups to policy- and decision-making in this context 'refers to interest groups' direct expression of demands to decision-makers' (Dür, 2008: 1221). Access however does not guarantee influence (Bouwen and Mccown, 2007: 425; Dür, 2008: 1221). Opposing interest groups may have the same access and political actors might ignore the policy directions they favour (Dür, 2008: 1221). The political opportunity structure therefore focuses

on the degree to which interest groups can gain access to the political actors and these actors are responsive to their claims (Princen and Kerremans, 2008: 1131).

Interest groups could lobby at the national and lobby directly at the European level (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008: 1148). Regarding the latter, the European Union provides interest groups with multiple points of access to the EU policy- and decision-making process (Coen, 1997: 91; Pollack, 1997: 577; Greenwood and Webster, 2000: 68; Klüver, 2013: 59; Richardson, 2000: 1006; Eising, 2008: 21; Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 184; Princen and Kerremans, 2008: 1129). Firstly, domestic interest groups may try to lobby their national governments to press for certain policy decisions in the Council of ministers (Pollack, 1997: 577). Secondly, domestic interest groups could lobby the European Commission that has the right of policy initiative (Pollack, 1997: 577). Thirdly, diffuse domestic interest groups might lobby the European Parliament (Pollack, 1997: 557). Interest groups lobby the European Commission, then the European Parliament and then the Council of ministers most often (Mahoney, 2008: 131).

Callanan finds evidence whether interest groups lobby on the national or European level is determined by which actors are most receptive to their policy positions (2011: 17). Schmidt takes a different position. She argues that Europeanization caused interest groups to focus on the European Union instead of the national government for access and influence (2006: 2). She states that interest groups have more influence on European policy-making when lobbying as organized interests on the European level instead of voting or protesting at the national level (2006: 2). Contrary, many authors state in accordance with intergovernmentalism that the main channels of interest mediation are national and that national interest groups (at least in first instance) direct their attention to the national level (Grossman, 2004: 637; Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 189; Beyers and Kerremans, 2012: 283; Poloni-Staudinger, 2008: 551). The member-state level is for domestic diffuse interest groups the easiest access point (Pollack, 1997: 557). It does not require a transnational organization of interests and national officials bear a direct responsibility to their electorates (Pollack, 1997: 557). Interest groups therefore firstly establish contacts with national governments before expanding their activities to the European level (Beyers and Kerremans, 2012: 463).

In this context Beyers and Kerremans state that domestic interest groups tend to lobby a closer level of governance (national level) more frequently compared to levels of governance (European level) that are located further away (2012: 283). Interest groups' power however is limited compared to the power of governments: although governments should represent their stakeholders' interests to some extent, they possess largely uncontrolled

discretion in EU-affairs (Schneider e.a., 2007: 456). Member states still predominantly form the centre of interest representation (Högenauer, 2014: 17). They try to gain access at different policy stages to influence the outcome of the European Union policy process (Versluis, 2011: 143).

These policy stages are part of a policy cycle, a model of five stages to explain public policy-making (Howlett e.a., 2009: 10). ‘*Agenda-setting* refers to the process by which problems come to the attention of governments; *policy formulation* refers to how policy options are formulated within government; *decision-making* is the process by which governments adopt a particular course of action or non-action; *policy implementation* relates to how governments put policies into effect; and *policy evaluation* refers to the processes by which the results of policies are monitored by both state and societal actors, the outcome of which may be reconceptualization of policy problems and solutions’ (Howlett e.a., 2009: 12). The early policy stages of EU policy-making (agenda-setting and the consultation period organized by the European Commission) provide the best chances for interest groups to get their interests represented in EU policy (Bunea, 2013: 552). Because of its monopoly for policy initiation the European Commission has a crucial role in agenda-setting and policy formulation (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185).

On the European level the European Commission provides an important access point for interest groups. Lobby groups tend to direct their attention to the European Commission because of its significant power (Mahoney, 2008: 145). It is therefore the most important European access point for interest groups (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185). This could also be explained by the fact that the European Commission is open to interest groups. It seriously considers the input of interest groups (Marks e.a., 1996: 358). Specialists and experts from different interest organizations work with the European Commission in committees (Versluis, 2011: 134). The Commission networks intensively because lobbyists’ support determines to a large extent how much opposition the policy receives when it is decided upon (Versluis, 2011: 134). Moreover, the Commission depends on the information external actors possess (Eising and Lehringer, 2011: 185). As a consequence it is not surprising that the European Commission has been intensively lobbied by interest groups (Pollack, 1997: 579).

On the European level the European Parliament also provides an important access point for interest groups. Its committee structure makes it accessible to interest groups to some extent (Pollack, 1997: 581). The European Parliament has become more important as a lobbying target because of its increased powers over the last fifteen years (Bouwen and Mccown, 2007: 424). The co-decision procedure that the Treaty of Maastricht introduced has

provided the European Parliament with real veto power in the EU policy process (Bouwen and Mccown, 2007: 424). Despite the fact that the Council of Ministers increasingly has to share its power with the European Parliament, it nevertheless still remains a crucial player in the European Union (Bouwen and Mccown, 2007: 424).

The European Council could also to some extent be regarded as an access point for interest groups. The European Council forms the principal legislative body of the EU, which makes it very relevant for interest groups (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185). This is especially the case when European Union policy proposals are important for national actors (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185). It is also important because the European Council solves problems that cannot be resolved at a lower level of intergovernmental cooperation (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185). The European council however, is difficult to access for interest groups and is therefore rarely lobbied (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185). Because the European Council and its administrative body, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and the Council working groups consist of national representatives, domestic interest groups direct their attention to civil servants of the national government (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 185).

2.2.2 Business versus diffuse interests

Interest representation in the European Union is not an easy task for these EU institutions because they are confronted with a great variety of interests. In this context non-business interests are often regarded as diffuse interests, because they have a great variety of policy goals and a well-defined group membership is absent (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 191). The European Union is to represent the sometimes opposing interests of these diverse diffuse and business stakeholders, which complicates agreeing upon a policy decision that is acceptable to all stakeholders.

These business and diffuse interest groups try to get their interests represented by member states' governments and EU institutions. Although business associations direct themselves more often to the EU-level, they also remain active at the member-state level (Wilts and Quittkat, 2003: 396). Scholars find that business groups gain better access than diffuse interest groups to the European Commission (Coen, 2007: 335; Klüver, 2012: 1130-1131) and the European Union (Saurugger, 2008: 1284). In the European Commission lobbying register more business interest groups and associations are present in policy areas where output legitimacy is higher valued and thus technical expertise is required (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013: 1117). Civil society groups are more present in policy areas were input

legitimacy is higher valued and thus require more political participation and consensus (Coen and Katsaitis, 2013: 1117). Generally, it is assumed that business interest groups provide technical expertise whereas diffuse interest groups offer legitimacy (Jarman, 2008: 29). Contrary, business and diffuse interest organizations themselves ‘feel that expertise gives them certain influence’ on EU policy (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007: 88).

However, disagreement exists to what extent these business and diffuse interest groups have been equally successful in lobbying the EU. For example, Bunea states that organizations representing concentrated interests (business groups) perform significantly better than organizations representing diffuse interests (for example, non-governmental organizations) in getting their interests represented at the European level (2013: 567). Contrary, other authors state that diffuse interest groups have been equally successful as concentrated interest groups in lobbying the European Union (Klüver, 2012: 1130; Chalmers, 2011: 484).

Whether interest groups organize themselves at the European or national level has no effect on lobbying success. European interest groups and domestic interest groups have been quite equally successful in lobbying the European Commission (Klüver, 2012: 1130). Whether business organizations lobby individually or collectively on the other hand does influence lobbying success. When large firms lobby individually they often secure better access to the European and national level than national associations (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 190).

2.2.3 European Union environmental policy- and decision-making

These interest groups are active in international environmental policy- and decision-making. The multiplicity and diversity of these environmental interest groups makes it very difficult to reach an international environmental agreement (Levy, 1997: 66; Bryner, 2008: 320). These business and diffuse interest organizations differ in how they lobby the European Union. Business organizations for example invest in general lobbying, where environmental interest groups focus on single policy decisions (Gullberg, 2008: 161). In this context, business and diffuse interest organizations do not lobby rationally. Environmental interest groups lobby less than would be considered rational and this could be explained by the fact that they have few resources at their disposal (Gullberg, 2008: 161). Business interest groups lobby more than is rational (Gullberg, 2008: 161). This might be explained by a long term perspective on the environmental policy field rather than a short-term focus on single policy decisions

(Gullberg, 2008: 161). Not surprisingly, these business and diffuse interest groups do not have the same degree of influence on environmental policy-making.

Business interest groups have considerable influence on the national policy negotiation position as well as on international environmental agreements. Firstly, business considerations are dominant in determining a country's negotiation position (Levy, 1997: 64). The national economic interest largely determines a country's negotiation position (Levy, 1997: 66). These positions of national governments then partly determine the outcome of international environmental negotiations (Grundig, 2009: 747). Secondly, these business interest groups have considerable influence on international environmental treaties (Levy, 1997: 55). Similarly, Newell and Paterson found that companies that profit from producing, processing and selling fossil fuels have been quite systematically able to represent their interests in international environmental policy negotiations (Newell and Paterson, 1998: 695). These findings would mean that business organizations would try to influence the national government's position as well as international institutions' positions in order to represent best their interests.

Contrary, Levy and Egan state that business interest groups tend to influence the environmental policy positions of their national governments and do not pressure international institutions much to adopt a certain position (Levy and Egan, 1998: 354). However, despite this claim, they also state that in this international arena of environmental policy-making multinationals are learning how to operate at both the national and international level (Levy and Egan, 1998: 355). At the European level business interest organizations lobby the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, 'but prefer to work with the Commission rather than the European Parliament' (Gullberg, 2008: 2971). Business interest groups seem to influence national environmental policy positions better than environmental interest groups (Böhmelt, 2013: 710). These business organizations form the biggest obstacle for environmental organizations in trying to influence EU environmental policy (Biliouri, 1999: 178). Their limited resources puts diffuse interest groups at a disadvantaged position compared to business interest groups (Biliouri, 1999: 178).

To represent their interests, environmental interest groups lobby individually at the European level or unite themselves in umbrella interest group organizations (Biliouri, 1999: 174). Environmental organizations provide the European Union with information and expertise for legitimacy purposes (Biliouri, 1999: 174). These diffuse interest groups use these resources to lobby the European Commission and the European Parliament to influence the policy proposal (Biliouri, 1999: 174). Environmental organizations lobby the European

Commission and Council via the European Parliament as the European Parliament is 'receptive to environmental groups' (Biliouri, 1999: 177). Similarly, Gullberg states that environmental organizations mainly lobby the European Parliament (2008: 2971). Rasmussen argues that the European Parliament has the reputation of being well open and accessible to diffuse interest groups (2012: 239). However, Rasmussen states that, because of its increased powers, the European Parliament now is intensively being lobbied by business interest groups as well (2012: 239). Consequently, the European Parliament nowadays is less biased towards diffuse interest groups compared to business interest groups (Rasmussen, 2012: 239-240).

Pressure from domestic interest groups can cause governments to change their strategy or position in international climate and environmental negotiations (Bailer, 2012: 535; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994: 78). Pressure from domestic environmental interest groups (either from business or diffuse interest groups) tends national governments to be less cooperative in international environmental negotiations (Bailer, 2012: 546). Also, interest groups can make domestic climate action difficult to realise (Dessai and Michaelowa, 2001: 339). National interest groups are here more vocal than EU associations when EU policies are being transposed into domestic law or being implemented by the national public administration (Eising and Lehringer, 2013: 189). Resulting from the above, consulting stakeholders can help improve environmental policy integration in EU energy policy, especially when they take place early on in the policy process (Vasileiadou and Tuinstra, 2013: 492). Similarly, Kostka and Hobbs argue that interest-bundling (the national government links their policy objectives with the interests of diverse business stakeholders) can contribute to achieving energy efficiency (climate) policy goals (2012: 783).

2.3 Determinants lobbying success

These interest groups possess certain characteristics and resources that contribute to lobbying success. Policy- and decision-makers receive the information they need from technical experts and lobbyists (Versluis, 2011: 134). Interest groups get their voices heard and hope that this contributes to the policy decision they favour. National governments are confronted with a plurality of interest groups that try to influence policy decisions (Klüver, 2013: 73). Consequently, the aggregated resources and characteristics of interest groups determine lobbying success (Klüver, 2013: 73). Namely, government should represent all stakeholders' interests. To get their interests represented, stakeholders can use a large variety of tactics.

Interest groups 'compete to shape the way problems are defined, resources are mobilised, options are framed and selected, legal action is authorised, and policies are

implemented' (Bryner, 2008: 320). To get their interests represented in the policy decision, they use inside and outside lobbying tactics. Lobby groups might use inside lobbying tactics to influence the policy decision by directly communicating to policymakers (Mahoney, 2008: 127). This involves for example participating in hearings, consultations and meetings, sending position papers and one-on-one meeting with policymakers and their staff (Mahoney, 2008: 127). Interest groups could also use outside lobbying tactics by reaching out to the public to influence the policy decision (Mahoney, 2008: 147). Regarding outside lobbying, civil society groups are most likely and business groups are less likely to use outside lobbying tactics (Mahoney, 2008: 163).

Interest group characteristics might also affect lobbying success. Firstly, the amount of resources like money, legitimacy, political support, knowledge, expertise and information (Dür, 2008: 1214; Biliouri, 1999: 176-177). The interdependence of private and public actors is caused by resource dependency, whereby private actors need access to the institutions and the public actor demands resources (Bouwen, 2002: 368-369; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007: 462). Interest groups can provide European Union institutions with these resources. For example, the European Commission demands scientific expertise and support from stakeholders (Haverland and Liefferink, 2012: 193). Also, interest groups can offer policy- and decision makers information about the needs and interests of the domestic and European policy sector and offer technical expertise (Bouwen, 2002: 369).

Interest groups' resources such as information, citizen support and economic power contribute to the ability of interest groups to lobby the European Commission (Klüver, 2013: 73). Business and large compared to general and small interest groups significantly differ in social and financial resources (Saurugger, 2008: 1282). The amount of the resources these interest groups possess is affected by structural characteristics like size, the type of membership and internal organization of the group and the degree of geographical concentration of the membership (Dür, 2008: 1214). For example, large interest groups might have more legitimacy (Dür, 2008: 1214). Also, the type of members (for example, firms or civil society groups) the organization consist of might have consequences for the resources it is able to attract. An internally hierarchically structured organization might be better able to provide information than an organization that has to cope with internal conflict (Dür, 2008: 1214). Geographically concentrated interests could facilitate overcoming collective action problems (Dür, 2008: 1214). However, geographically dispersed organized interest groups have the advantage of being represented in various regions (Dür, 2008: 1214).

The advocate type might also influence lobbying success (Mahoney, 2008: 43). Citizen groups probably focus more on common shared goals, while business organisations more likely use technical or scientific arguments to represent their positions (Mahoney, 2008: 43-44). Overall, many strategies (for example, hiring a professional lobbyist or joining an ad hoc coalition) that lobbyists perceive as essential in achieving their goals have no effect at all (Mahoney, 2008: 205). The broader political and issue context and environment largely determine lobbying success (Mahoney, 2008: 206).

2.4 Research gaps and topic of inquiry

This literature review sets out the current knowledge on interest representation in European Union (environmental) policy-making. It considers the two major theories (intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance) in explaining how domestic stakeholders' interests are represented in EU policy-making. It examines the role domestic interest groups play in this context. It focuses to a large extent on (the success of) the lobbying activities domestic stakeholders in general exercise to represent their interests. It analyses which national and EU access points domestic stakeholders generally target to represent their interests and to what extent their lobbying activities are successful. In this regard a distinction is made between the lobbying activities and success of business and diffuse domestic interest groups.

The current literature does not focus much on the role domestic interest groups play into environmental interest formulation and representation on the European level by the national government and the EU institutions. It focuses even less on to what extent domestic stakeholders' interests are represented by the national government and the EU and how the stakeholders themselves perceive that their interests are represented in EU environmental policy. Therefore this is the focus of this research. It is intended to provide insight in to what extent the interests of domestic environmental policy stakeholders have been represented by the national government and the EU. Furthermore, it tries to explain why the interests of these domestic stakeholders have been represented to a certain degree on the national and European levels. In this context few research focuses on the representation of domestic diffuse and business organizations' interests in EU environmental policy. This inquiry therefore examines to what extent business and diffuse organizations' interests are represented in EU environmental policy and how this can be explained.

This inquiry focuses on the differences and similarities in the representation of business and diffuse interests. It tries to provide explanations for the degree of representation

of the domestic stakeholders' interests in European environmental policy. It inquires whether business or diffuse considerations are dominant in a country's environmental policy negotiation position. To achieve this purpose, this research compares the policy positions of the business and diffuse domestic stakeholders with the national government's standpoint.

This inquiry furthermore maps what kind of lobbying activities the domestic stakeholders undertook to represent their interests. It examines to what extent domestic interest groups themselves lobbied the national government and the EU to represent their interests. It analyses which access points they targeted, why they lobbied these institutions and whether this supports the European integration theory of intergovernmentalism or multi-level governance. Also, this thesis inquires whether the domestic stakeholders feel they have had an impact on the national government's policy position and to what extent they perceive the national government's and EU institutions' standpoints coincide with their interests. The next chapter describes the methodology of this inquiry.

3. Methodology

The previous chapter considers the current literature on the representation of domestic business and diffuse stakeholders' interests in EU (environmental) policy-making. It examines the two major theories of European integration and which access points business and diffuse domestic interest groups generally target in EU policy-making. It sets out the current knowledge on why domestic stakeholders lobbied these actors and to what extent their lobbying activities have been successful. It analyses the degree of the representation of domestic business and diffuse interest groups' interests in EU policy-making.

These elements are translated into the research design of this inquiry. This research analyses interest representation in European Union environmental policy-making. This chapter presents this methodology to examine to what extent Dutch domestic business and diffuse stakeholders' interests have been represented by the Dutch national government and the EU in the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.

3.1 Dependent and independent variables

The dependent variable in this inquiry is the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests by the national government in EU policy. This research distinguishes between objective and subjective interest representation³. The former refers to what extent the national governments' and EU institutions' policy positions and lobbying activities before and during the EU policy negotiations and the European Union policy decision actually reflect the domestic stakeholders' interests. The latter indicates to what extent domestic stakeholders themselves perceive that the national government and EU institutions before and during the negotiations and the EU policy decision represent their interests.

The independent variables in this inquiry are the domestic stakeholders', the national government's and the EU institutions' policy positions and lobbying activities, because these independent variables strongly determine to what extent domestic stakeholders' interests are represented. Firstly, stakeholders' positions could positively influence the national government's and European Union policy positions. Secondly, stakeholders can undertake lobbying activities and target national and European Union access points to make their interests known. Thirdly, the national government formulates and tries to defend its position

³ The execution of this inquiry showed that a distinction can be made between objective and subjective interest representation. Previous research recognizes this difference between an objective and subjective view: (...) 'different subjects perceive the same objective decision problem in different ways and (...) they react in relation to their own perceptions' (Svenson, 1979: 109).

before and during European policy negotiations. Fourthly, the EU institutions' positions can influence the policy outcome. These positions and lobbying activities all can positively influence the degree of representation of domestic groups' interests. If stakeholders promote their interests at the national and European levels effectively and the national government and the EU represent their interests in EU policy- and decision-making adequately, the degree of interest representation is positively influenced.

Figure two provides a visualisation of the relationship between the here described dependent and independent variables. The interest representation process starts with the positions of the domestic stakeholders. These interests can be represented during the European Union policy- and decision-making process in the standpoints and via the actions of the national government and by the domestic stakeholders themselves. This process results in an outcome, the EU decision. The objective and subjective difference of this policy outcome and the domestic stakeholders' standpoints is the degree of interest representation.




Figure two: Representation of domestic stakeholders' interests in EU policy- and decision-making.

3.2 Measurement

To examine the objective and subjective representation of domestic stakeholders' interests by the national government and the EU, this research distinguishes between the process and outcome of interest representation.

3.2.1 The process of interest representation

This thesis sees the objective process of interest representation as to what extent the national governments' and European Union institutions' positions before and during the EU-policy negotiations neutrally represent domestic stakeholders' interests. The subjective process of interest representation is defined as domestic stakeholders' perception of to what extent the national government before and during the EU-policy negotiations represents their interests.

This research does not regard domestic stakeholders' neutral impact on the national government's and EU institutions' policy positions. Much of the EU negotiation process takes place behind closed door and many variables influence the policy positions of the EU institutions and the national government. Consequently, it is very difficult to objectively assess to what extent the national government and EU institutions represented domestic stakeholders' interests during negotiation meetings. Moreover, it is problematic to neutrally assess whether the domestic stakeholders' lobbying activities have influenced governmental positions during the process of interest representation.

However, as part of the objective process of interest representation and to contribute to the existing literature on lobbying this research analyses which lobbying activities domestic stakeholders undertook and which national and European Union access points they targeted to represent their interests. To objectively analyse the process of interest representation, this inquiry furthermore compares the national government's and the EU institutions' policy standpoints before and during the EU policy negotiations with the policy positions of domestic stakeholders.

The subjective process of interest representation is measured by asking the domestic stakeholders to what extent they feel that the national government's policy position before and during the EU negotiations represents their interests. In this regard policy impact also is analysed: whether stakeholders feel that their lobbying activities have influenced the content (Vasileiadou and Tuinstra, 2013: 482) of the standpoints of the national government before and during the EU negotiations. This contributes to existing research since very few inquiries are directed towards analysing domestic stakeholders' perceptions of the process of interest representation in EU policy-making.

3.2.2 The outcome of interest representation

This inquiry regards the objective outcome of interest representation as to what extent the EU policy decision neutrally represents domestic stakeholders' interests. The subjective outcome of interest representation is defined as domestic stakeholders' and the national government's perception of to what extent the EU policy decision represents their interests.

The objective outcome of interest representation is measured by comparing the domestic stakeholders' positions with the EU policy decision. This contributes to the existing literature on the extent to which business and diffuse stakeholders' interests are represented by the national government and the EU in EU policy-making. The subjective outcome of interest representation is measured by examining how the national stakeholders and the national government perceive the policy outcome of the European negotiations. As domestic stakeholders' perception of interest representation in EU policy-making has received very little attention yet, this research contributes to filling this theoretical gap to some extent. Table two provides an overview of how the objective and subjective process and outcome of the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests are measured.

Table two: Operationalisation of the objective and subjective process and outcome of interest representation in EU policy- and decision-making.

Concept	Definition	Indicators	Data sources
The objective process of interest representation	To what extent the national governments' and EU institutions' positions before and during the EU policy negotiations neutrally represent domestic stakeholders' interests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Domestic stakeholders' positions 2. Domestic stakeholders' lobbying activities 3. National government's standpoint 4. European Union institutions' standpoints 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews domestic stakeholders - Public statements and letters domestic stakeholders - Governmental letters - Interview civil servants - EU policy documents
The subjective process of interest representation	Domestic stakeholders' perception of to what extent the national government before and during the EU policy negotiations represents their interests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Impact own lobbying activities on the position of government 2. Perception national government's standpoint and lobbying activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews domestic stakeholders - Public statements and letters domestic interest groups
The objective outcome of interest representation	To what extent the EU policy decision neutrally represents the domestic stakeholders' interests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Domestic stakeholders' positions 2. European Union policy decision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews domestic stakeholders - Public statements and letters stakeholders - EU policy documents
The subjective outcome of interest representation	Domestic stakeholders' and the national government's perception of to what extent the EU policy decision represents their interests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Perception of the European Union policy decision 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Interviews stakeholders - Public statements and letters domestic interest groups - Interviews civil servants

3.3 Research strategy

This inquiry forms a case study because it analyses in-depth a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin, 2009: 18). It is a single and qualitative case study. This research is a single case study because it analyses the representation of domestic stakeholders'

interests in one case, the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. It analyses the most important elements of the policy framework: the targets on greenhouse gas reduction, renewable energy and energy savings, the ETS design and the framework's relationship with the international context.

This inquiry is a qualitative case study because it analyses the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests using qualitative methods. The most important information is gathered through interviews with domestic environmental policy stakeholders and three civil servants working for the national government. These interviews provide input for both the dependent as the independent variables. The perception of the respondents regarding how their interests have been represented is used to analyse the subjective process and outcome of interest representation. The interest groups' standpoints regarding the EU 2030 policy framework the respondents talk about are used to examine the objective process and outcome of interest representation. Additionally, this inquiry qualitatively analyses official governmental and stakeholder documents and public statements regarding their policy positions and lobbying activities to analyse the process and outcome of interest representation.

All interviews are analysed in three steps. Firstly, this author highlights all statements that seem relevant in the transcripts of the interviews. Secondly, this researcher names the identified important elements with codes, overarching themes related to this inquiry's research question, independent and dependent variables that come up in a large majority of interviews. For this task this author does not use a special coding program but personally identifies these common themes. Thirdly, this researcher compares and combines the codes where necessary. Coding the interviews in such a way allows it to easily compare the domestic stakeholders' statements regarding a certain theme. By examining these statements from each code this inquiry identifies certain characteristics and perceptions of the distinguished domestic interest groups regarding a certain topic. The code lists from the interviews can be found in Annex-IV and Annex-V.

These codes firstly result from the most important elements of the 2030 policy framework itself. These codes focus on the domestic stakeholders' and national government's positions regarding the policy targets on greenhouse gas emission reduction, renewable energy, energy savings, the design of the ETS, the evaluation passage and the international context of the 2030 policy framework. Secondly, the codes come from the scientific literature. These codes focus on the lobbying activities domestic stakeholders undertake to represent their interest, which access points they target and to what extent they have been successful in lobbying their national government. These codes moreover relate to the domestic

stakeholders' perception of their national government's policy position and the impact of the regime's actions on the outcome of the 2030 policy framework. Finally, the codes result from the other remaining kinds of common statements from the respondents.

3.4 Units of analysis and observation

The units of analysis of this research are the Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders. The units of observation have been non-randomly selected. The most important fossil fuel and renewable energy oriented business and environmental interest groups became part of a list of about 45 stakeholder organizations. From this list the units of observation have been selected that have in the opinion of this author the most clear stakes in EU environmental policy-making. These interest groups were approached to conduct an interview.

This resulted in about 35 stakeholder organizations that were contacted by phone and e-mail to conduct an interview. Additionally civil servants working for the Dutch national government were approached to include a national governmental perspective on the EU 2030 environmental policy-making process and outcome. Eventually representatives from 14 Dutch domestic interest groups and three civil servants working for the Dutch national government were willing to contribute to this research by conducting an interview. Representatives from the Dutch domestic stakeholder organizations occupied functions as director, secretary, manager, policy advisor and lobbyist on environmental, climate and energy matters. To protect the identity of the respondents neither their names nor their exact functions are included in the list of respondents. Similarly, this inquiry only refers anonymously to groups of stakeholders instead of to specific organizations to guarantee their anonymity.

Each domestic stakeholder interview considered the same basic list of themes related to the interest representation process and outcome. This topic list can be found in Annex-I. The interviews were semi-structured. Depending on the direction of the conversation the topics were considered during different stages of the interview. The average interview took about 45 minutes. Some interviews were a little shorter and some interviews were longer, depending on the speed of talking and the relevant information the respondent could share. The topic list for the civil servants interviews can be found in Annex-II and Annex-III. The length of these interviews varied between about 30 and 60 minutes, for the same reason as mentioned earlier.

The interviewed three central governmental actors and 14 Dutch domestic stakeholders form the units of observation of this research. Table three provides an overview of the units of observation of this research.

Table three: Units of observation.

Governmental organizations
Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Ministry of Infrastructure & Environment
Permanent Representation on Environmental and Nature Policy
Companies / Lobbyists
De Groene Zaak (Association of Dutch Employers)
Duurzame Energiekoepel (Association of the Dutch Renewable Energy Sector)
Energie Nederland (Association of Dutch Energy Producers)
FME (Association of the Dutch Technological Industry)
Klimaatplein (Dutch Organization Aiming to Accelerate the GHG emissions reductions)
Koninklijke Metaalunie (Association of the Dutch Metallurgic Industry)
NOGEPa (Association of the Dutch Oil and Gas Industry)
NVDB (Association of the Dutch Sustainable Biofuel Sector)
RAI Vereniging (Association of the Dutch Transport Sector)
VNCI (Association of the Dutch Chemical Industry)
VNO-NCW (Association of Dutch Employers)
Environmental Groups / NGO's
Greenpeace
Natuur & Milieu

Two civil servants (one civil servant from the ministry of Economic Affairs and one civil servant from the ministry of Infrastructure and Environment) that have been involved with the Dutch government's standpoint determination are part of this sample in order to understand this process. A civil servant (from the Dutch Permanent Representation) that operated on the EU level is part of this sample in order to gain some insight into the environmental policy negotiations on the EU level and the Dutch role in these negotiations.

The association of the Dutch governmental regions is incorporated in this sample, because much of the climate mitigation takes place in their regions. Seven business interest organizations of the oil and gas, chemical, energy, metallurgic, transport, technological and general industry and employers are part of this sample to assess interest representation of those actors that are more energy intensive oriented. Four business interest organizations explicitly focusing on renewable energy and reducing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions and two environmental organizations are part of this sample to assess interest representation of those actors that are more environmental oriented. By having similar numbers of stakeholders that are more fossil fuel and renewable energy oriented, a comparison can be made between the way in which the Dutch national government represents the interests of the more energy intensive and the more environmental oriented groups of stakeholders.

3.5 Validity and reliability

The methodology of this inquiry has limitations for validity and reliability purposes. The qualitative research methods improve the internal validity, but limit the external validity of this inquiry to a small extent. This inquiry has less limitations for reliability purposes.

The exclusion of a few important stakeholders in the sample of this research limits the external validity to a small extent. Although the most important stakeholders are part of the units of observation, a few important groups of stakeholders like Dutch citizens, politicians, municipal governance institutions and the agricultural sector are not incorporated in this research. This is due to the limited amount of time for writing this thesis. Nevertheless, the most important groups of stakeholders are part of the sample of this research and therefore the sample quite adequately reflects the Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests.

Furthermore, business interest groups are overrepresented in this sample. Much less environmental groups are part of this sample, because most environmental groups did not want to or were not able to conduct an interview. Therefore no strict distinction between business and environmental interests can be made in this inquiry. Nevertheless, one part of the in the sample included business organizations is explicitly more environmental oriented whereas the other part of the business organizations is more energy intensive oriented. Consequently, this inquiry can still compare the representation of these diverse 'more environmental oriented business' and 'more energy intensive oriented business' interests.

This inquiry consists of a single and qualitative case study because this strongly improves the internal validity of this research. The extensive analysis of this EU

environmental policy- and decision-making case gains in-depth knowledge of the representation process and outcome of Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders' interests. These findings can be used as input for refining existing theories of this topic and improve the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests in future EU policy- and decision-making. Further research can then examine whether these findings also occur in other policy fields and larger samples within the Netherlands and other EU member states.

However, the qualitative nature of this single case study causes some problems regarding the internal validity of this research. The qualitative nature of this research prevents exact determination of the strength of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. As a consequence, it is not possible to determine to what extent the domestic stakeholders', national government's and EU institutions' positions and lobbying activities influence the degree of the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests. This does not allow us to state which independent variables have most causal influence on the dependent variable of this research. This is not a problem for the purpose of this analysis, as it is not intended to determine the exact degree of causation between the independent and dependent variables. Time is too scarce for also performing this task.

Furthermore and more importantly, it is highly problematic to analyse the degree of causation between these variables. One might find clear correlation between the independent and dependent variables. However, this does not say anything about the degree of causation. The national government's policy position is influenced by many other factors rather than the policy positions and lobbying activities of domestic stakeholders. Similarly, the European Union policy decision is influenced by many other factors such as other member states' policy preferences and individual but powerful politicians' policy positions and lobbying activities. Also, much of the negotiation process takes place behind closed doors. Consequently, it is possible to determine the degree of correlation but highly problematic to analyse the degree of causation between the independent and dependent variables. Testing the findings of this research on correlation and perhaps even on the degree of causation can be done by other researchers in new inquiries.

This is possible for other researchers as this inquiry has less limitations in terms of reliability. This proposal describes in detail how the concepts of objective and subjective interest representation are measured. Consequently, other researchers can execute this research as well to determine whether they come to similar conclusions and whether these findings also occur in other policy fields and larger samples.

3.6 Overview methodology

This research analyses the objective and subjective process and outcome of the representation of domestic stakeholders' interests. It analyses to what extent the Dutch government and the EU represented Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests by examining the policy negotiations regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. This is done through a neutral lens (objective interest representation) and through the domestic environmental policy stakeholders' own lens (subjective interest representation). The next chapter describes the policy-making process and outcome regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.

4. The European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy

This chapter describes the process and outcome of the EU policy- and decision-making on the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. Firstly, it discusses the European Commission green paper on the 2030 policy framework and the Dutch Cabinet's reaction regarding the green paper. Secondly, it considers the European Commission policy proposal for the 2030 policy framework and the Dutch government's policy position regarding the proposal. Thirdly, it examines the outcome of the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy and the Dutch government's reaction on the outcome.

4.1 The European Commission green paper

4.1.1 Content and stakeholders' reactions

The European Commission published the Green Paper on the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy on March 27, 2013. The goal of the Green Paper was to obtain stakeholders' perceptions and knowledge which can be used to develop the formal proposal for the actual policy framework. The European Commission with the green paper demanded expression of views and expertise on four issues related to European energy and environmental policy: targets, coherence of policy instruments, competitiveness and the different capacity of member states to act (European Commission, 2013: 3-7).

Firstly, the European Commission demanded input regarding the 'types, nature and level of targets and how they interact' (European Commission, 2013: 7). The Commission asked perceptions and information on whether targets should be on the European or national level, sectoral or general level and legally binding or non-legally binding. It was interested in whether and how the policy framework should be directed towards achieving multiple (greenhouse gas emission reductions, amount of renewable energy, energy savings) goals at once. The Commission stated that the European Union 2050 Low Carbon Economy Roadmap suggests that by 2030 a 40 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions would be cost-effective. Secondly, the European Commission demanded input regarding how an effective interacting system of energy and environmental policy instruments can be designed. These policy instruments should be coherent on EU-level but be flexible so that member states can meet targets in the for them most appropriate way. Thirdly, the European Commission demanded input regarding the policy framework's consequences for the domestic and international energy markets and prices and whether it enhances the competitive economic position of the EU and member states. In this context the role of the EU Emissions Trading

System (ETS) should be analysed. Fourthly and finally, the European Commission demanded input regarding how the burden should be allocated among member states that are unequally able to implement climate and energy policy measures (European Commission, 2013: 7-12).

The consultation lasted until July 2, 2013 (European Commission, 2013: 14). The European Commission received more than 550 contributions from a large diversity of stakeholders, including fourteen member states. Business interest organizations formed the largest responding group (almost 60 percent), while diffuse interest organizations were the second largest responding group (a little over 20 percent) (European Commission, 2013: 1).

In general, member states and stakeholders wanted the European Union to decide upon a 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. In this context they pointed to the need to continue working on its climate objectives whilst also ensuring that other major economies do this as well (European Commission, 2013: 1). They emphasized the importance of ‘competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability’ (European Commission, 2013: 2). Agreement furthermore existed that the Emissions Trading System should remain a central policy instrument, additional policies are necessary and low carbon investment should become more cost-effective (European Commission, 2013: 3).

Diverse views existed regarding the appropriate level of greenhouse gas emission reduction and the usefulness of renewables’ and energy savings’ targets. Business interest organizations generally argued that cost-competitiveness, security of supply and environmental objectives should more be seen as equally important. Business interest organizations nevertheless agreed with diffuse interest organizations that a 2030 greenhouse gas emissions reduction target should be set. However, disagreement existed on whether renewables’ and energy savings’ targets should be set. General industry organizations, the energy sector and energy intensive industries were typically against, whilst organizations that provide low carbon equipment supported these targets. Diffuse interest organizations generally demanded ambitious targets irrespective of action in third countries (European Commission, 2013: 1-3).

4.1.2 The Dutch government’s reaction

When the European Commission consulted stakeholders to obtain their input regarding the 2030 policy framework for climate and energy the Dutch government in first instance did not send a letter to the European Commission (European Commission, 2013: 1). The Dutch Cabinet needed more time to discuss its policy position. On September 19, 2013, the Dutch

Cabinet sent its policy position regarding the Green Paper of the European Commission to the House of Representatives (Mansveld, 2013: 1).

The Dutch government internationally aimed to have a sustainable energy provision system by 2050. In this context the European Union should take the lead in environmental policy to convince other countries to mitigate climate change as well. According to the government, the climate policy framework for 2030 should be directed towards reducing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions with 80-95 percent by 2050. The Dutch government aimed at a reduction of 40 percent in the emissions of greenhouse gases by 2030 compared to 1990. The Dutch position was not fixed, because it would be partly determined by global climate agreements, the European Commission impact assessment and the financial consequences for the Netherlands (Mansveld, 2013: 2-5).

The Dutch government stated that renewable energy should become a normal part of the energy market. The policy framework should therefore direct towards reducing costs of the energy technologies that are needed in 2030 and 2050. Finally, energy savings also were a priority for the Dutch Cabinet (Mansveld, 2013: 2-6). The climate mitigation policy actions should take into account the diverse climate mitigation capacities of and be equally spread among EU member states. The most important criterion is realising a completely sustainable energy provision in the most cost-effective manner (Mansveld, 2013: 16).

The Dutch government wanted to structurally strengthen the European Union Emissions Trading System. It wanted to intensify the Emissions Trading System after 2020 and direct it towards the greenhouse gas emissions reduction amounts for 2030 and 2050. In principle it supported the extension of ETS to other policy sectors, especially when this is on request of these policy sectors. The Dutch government declared that carbon leakage (more greenhouse gas emissions in region A as a consequence of greenhouse gas emissions reductions in region B) could best be prevented by agreeing with competitive countries on a price for CO₂ or by worldwide environmental agreements. To represent internationally operating companies' competitive position, it saw another option in allocating free allowances (depending on benchmarks and production output) to companies (Mansveld, 2013: 2-9).

On October 17, 2013, the Dutch House of Representatives debated on the Dutch Cabinet's concept reaction regarding the EC green paper. The Cabinet responded to questions from members of the Senate on November 13, 2013, (questions from the Labour and Green parties) and on December 19, 2013, (questions from the Green party). These exchanges of information did not result in changes in the Dutch government's policy position and therefore

the Cabinet's policy position regarding the EC green paper has been sent unmodified to the European Commission (Mansveld, 2013: 1).

4.2 The European Commission policy proposal

4.2.1 Content

The European Commission published the communication for the 2030 policy framework for climate and energy on January 22, 2014 (European Commission, 2014: 1). The European Commission proposed to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU with 40 percent compared to 1990 by 2030, shared between the Emission Trading System sectors and the other sectors. The ETS sector would have to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas emissions with 43 percent and the non-ETS sector with 30 percent compared to 2005. The non-ETS targets for the European Union as a whole would be allocated amongst member states in an appropriate and timely way (European Commission, 2014: 5).

The greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets would be accompanied by a binding EU target of at least 27 percent renewable energy by 2030, with flexibility for member states to set national objectives. This binding renewable energy target for the European Union would not be translated into national targets to provide member states with greater flexibility in achieving their greenhouse gas emission reduction goals. The energy savings targets for 2030 would be concluded later in 2014 in a review of the Energy Efficiency Directive. However, a greenhouse gas emissions reduction of 40 percent would mean approximately 25 percent energy savings by 2030 (European Commission, 2014: 5-8).

The EC furthermore proposed to modify the Emission Trading System by establishing a market stability reserve. This mechanism would automatically adjust the amount of allowances upwards or downwards (depending on a pre-determined set of rules) to prevent market shocks and enhance market stability. The EC also proposed to continue to monitor the application of existing carbon leakage rules to contribute to competitive and affordable energy (European Commission, 2014: 8-11).

The European Commission proposed not to continue the ten percent renewable energy and six percent greenhouse gas emissions reductions goals in transport (Mansveld, 2014: 9). Instead, it referred to the Commission White Paper from 2011 containing a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of 60 percent by 2050 compared to 1990 and around 20 percent by 2030 compared to 2008 (European Commission, 2014: 14).

Member states would have to formulate national plans for realizing greenhouse gas emissions reductions and competitive, secure and sustainable energy targets. The European

Commission would monitor and report periodically on these plans in relationship to the policy target indicators. In the international context of climate mitigation the EC stated that the European Union should take further ambitious climate mitigation action but should also enhance international action (European Commission, 2014: 12-18).

4.2.2 The Dutch government's reaction

February 7, 2014, the Dutch government sent its reaction regarding the communication from the European Commission for the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy to the Dutch House of Representatives. The Cabinet emphasized again the need for an international environmental agreement and the leading role the European Union should play in these negotiations by agreeing upon a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 40 percent in the EU. The Dutch government aimed at early decision-making on such policy measures. The Cabinet supported the European Commission policy proposal. The Dutch government stated that all EU member states should actually reduce their amount of greenhouse gas emissions from 2020 onward (Mansveld, 2014: 1-4).

The Dutch government saw a binding reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions of 40 percent as the minimum possible amount of the negotiations' outcome. The Cabinet also supported a renewable energy target for the European Union as a whole. However, a condition was that this target cannot interfere with the ETS and that the European Commission should elaborate on what happens when the renewable energy targets are not realized. The CO₂-reductions should be leading in realizing the environmental policy goals. The Cabinet saw strengthening the ETS by increasing the annual cap from 1.74 to 2.2 percent and a stability reserve as good elements, but did not take a definitive position (Mansveld, 2014: 1-3). It stated that carbon leakage could best be prevented by global environmental agreements and agreeing upon a price for CO₂ with competitive countries (Mansveld, 2014: 7).

The Dutch government furthermore supported the proposal for annual energy plans but demanded more information from the European Commission regarding what happens when the Commission and member states do not agree with a member states' annual energy plan. Member states should in this regard keep the authority to determine which forms of (renewable and fossil fuel) energy they want to produce. Finally, the Cabinet supported the Commission greenhouse gas emissions reduction goals for transport, but was disappointed the European Commission did not want to continue its original CO₂-reduction goals for the transport sector from the EU-directive transport fuel quality (Mansveld, 2014: 8-10).

February 20, 2014, the Dutch House of Representatives agreed upon the motion-Van Veldhoven-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber. It requested the Dutch government to plead in Europe for a structural solution for the Emissions Trading System by putting the backloaded emission rights in the stability mechanism, increase the annual cut in the amount of emission rights quicker or remove a certain amount of emission rights after a period of time (Van Veldhoven e.a., 2014). Furthermore, on February 20, 2014, the Dutch House of Representatives agreed upon the motion-Vos. With this motion it requested the Dutch government not to resist to a binding renewable energy target, or to plead for a single target, and to act with the Dutch energy agreement in mind, until the results of the research conducted by PBL and ECN are discussed with the House of Representatives (Vos, 2014).

The Cabinet asked the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands to calculate the financial effects of the European Commission proposal for the Netherlands (Mansveld, 2014: 3). These research institutes stated that, depending on effort-sharing, the Netherlands would have to reduce CO₂-emissions with 28-48 percent in the non-ETS sectors. They concluded that the European renewable energy target would mean a goal of 20-23 percent for the Netherlands. Continuing current Dutch energy policy would only result in 12 percent energy savings, whereas the Commission aimed at 25 percent for the Union as a whole (Mansveld and Kamp, 2014: 2-3).

These research institutes' findings have been valuable in determining the Cabinet's policy position. September 26, 2014, The Dutch government sent its policy position to the Dutch House of Representatives. The Cabinet supported the Commission proposal regarding the 40 percent CO₂-emissions reductions (43 percent ETS and 30 percent non-ETS). Regarding effort-sharing it stated that the allocation of non-ETS targets should be based on cost-effectivity (which results in lower targets for the Netherlands) instead of BBP/capita (which results in higher targets for the Netherlands). Additionally, the Dutch government agreed with a binding EU target of 27 percent renewable energy by 2030. The Cabinet furthermore argued that the 30 percent energy savings goal could not lead to less effectivity of the ETS. It aimed at an energy savings target of 25 percent for the European Union. The government stated that these EU environmental policy goals should be translated into indicative individual goals for member states (Mansveld and Kamp, 2014: 3-5).

On October 2, 2014, the Dutch House of Representatives agreed upon the motion-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber with which it requested the Dutch government to plead for a binding renewable energy target on member state level (Van Tongeren and Dik-Faber, 2014). Furthermore, on October 15, 2014, the Dutch House of Representatives agreed upon the

motion-Ouwehand with which it requested the Dutch government to at least plead for or at least not resist to the by the European Commission proposed targets for renewable energy and energy savings (Ouwehand, 2014). Because of this motion, the Cabinet changed its position and on October 23, 2014, the Dutch regime argued it would support a 30 percent energy savings target (Mansveld, 2014).

4.3 The European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy

4.3.1 Content

During the European Council negotiations of October 23 and 24, 2014, the European Council decided upon a binding EU target of a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions with 40 percent by 2030 compared to 1990. All member states contribute to reducing the amount of greenhouse gases (varying from 0 to -40 percent). The non-ETS sector accounts for 30 percent and the ETS sector for 43 percent of the greenhouse gas reductions in 2030 compared to 2005. The non-ETS targets are fairly divided among all member states. Targets for member states with high gross domestic products are adjusted to reflect cost-effectiveness in a fair and balanced manner. The flexibility of policy instruments is enhanced to achieve realising these greenhouse gas emission reduction targets (European Council, 2014: 1-4).

Furthermore, the European Council agreed upon a binding EU target of 27 percent renewable energy by 2030. Similarly, the European Council set an indicative EU target of 27 percent energy efficiency improvement in 2030 compared to projections of future energy consumption based on current criteria. Having in mind an EU-level of 30 percent, this is reviewed by 2020. Member states are not assigned nationally binding targets (European Council, 2014: 5).

The ETS caps (the maximum permitted emissions) are reduced annually with 2.2 (replacing the 1.74) percent from 2021 onwards. Free allocation of allowances continues after 2020 to provide sectors with support that face the risk of losing international competitiveness. Member states with a gross domestic product below 60 percent of the EU-average are allowed to give free allowances to the energy sector up to 2030. After 2020 these free allowances cannot be more than 40 percent of the allocated allowances to the member states using this option. Furthermore, a new reserve of two percent of the ETS allowances is set aside to invest in low income member states (with a gross domestic product below 60 percent of the EU-average) to improve their energy efficiency and modernise their energy systems. Furthermore, ten percent of the ETS allowances of the EU is distributed among countries whose gross domestic products are below 90 percent of the EU-average. The rest of the allowances are

distributed among member states on the basis of verified emissions (European Council, 2014: 2-3).

The European Council asked the European Commission to examine policy measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and enhance energy efficiency in transport. It furthermore asked to rapidly adopt a directive regarding calculation methods and reporting requirements to enhance the quality of petrol and diesel fuels (European Council, 2014: 4). Table four provides an overview of the European Commission policy proposal, the Dutch government's reaction and the European Council policy decision regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. It focuses on greenhouse gas emissions reductions, renewable energy, energy savings, ETS, the governance framework and the international context. These elements are included in the table because they are the main elements of the 2030 policy framework and therefore can have most impact on the Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests.

Table four: The EC proposal, the Dutch government's standpoint and the European Council's policy decision regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.

	EC climate and energy policy framework proposal for 2030	Dutch government's policy position regarding the EC proposal	European Council climate and energy policy framework for 2030
GHG reduction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 40 % (binding at EU and member state level) compared to 1990 - Attributed on the basis of relative wealth using GDP per capita 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least 40 % (binding at EU and member state level) compared to 1990 - All member states participate; allocation on cost-effectiveness 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 40 % (binding at EU and member state level) compared to 1990 - Allocation on the basis of cost-effectiveness
Renewable energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At least 27 % (binding at EU level) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 27 % (binding at EU-level) - CO₂-target is leading 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 27 % (binding at EU level) - No member state targets
Energy savings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Approximately 25 % (non-binding) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 25 % (non-binding) - Target cannot diminish ETS effectivity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 27 % at EU level (indicative, having in mind an EU level of 30 %) - No member state targets
ETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Annually decrease cap from 1.74 to 2.2 % after 2020 - Market stability reserve - Free allowances to prevent carbon leakage 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Change reduction cap from 1.74 to 2.2 % and a stability reserve good - Free allowances to prevent carbon leakage and agree on CO₂-price with other countries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Market stability mechanism - Annual factor reduced from 1.74 to 2.2 % from 2021 onwards - Free allowances allocation can continue
Governance framework and international context	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National energy plans reviewed and monitored by EC - International agreement desirable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Could support checking national energy plans - EU should take lead in international negotiations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National energy plans controlled by EC - Goals evaluated depending on outcome COP-21

4.3.2 The Dutch Cabinet's reaction

The Dutch Cabinet is satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations for the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. It sees the agreement as both ambitious and realistic. Moreover, it states that the agreement forms a reliable, predictable and payable package of measures. It is an important step towards achieving the policy goals of the EU energy roadmap. Furthermore, it provides Europe with a good starting point to take the lead in the international environmental negotiations in Paris (Koenders, 2014). The next chapter describes the process and outcome of the representation of Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests in the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. The interviews with the domestic stakeholders and the civil servants provide the basis for this analysis.

5. Representation of Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests

This chapter presents an overview of the information this inquiry obtained to determine the objective and subjective process and outcome of the representation of Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests in the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. Objective interest representation is analysed through a neutral lens, whereas subjective is measured through the lens of the actors involved. The next passages describe the objective and subjective process and the objective and subjective outcome of representing the Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests by the Dutch government in the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.

5.1 The objective process of interest representation

The objective process of interest representation consists of the Dutch domestic stakeholders' environmental policy positions, the lobbying activities they undertook to get their interests represented, the national government's standpoint and the EU institutions' policy positions regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. In the previous chapter the Dutch government's and European Union institutions' standpoints have been set out. In the following sections the Dutch domestic stakeholders' positions and lobbying activities are described.

5.1.1 Domestic stakeholders' positions

The Dutch domestic stakeholders differ in their position of whether the EU environmental policy should contain targets on greenhouse gas reduction, renewable energy and energy savings. Industry-wide a movement exists that pleads for a single target for CO₂-reduction and no targets on renewable energy and energy savings. This standpoint is supported by most of the more energy intensive business stakeholders. These actors state it is less cost-effective to have a triple target. As one respondent states: *'waarom we een single target moeten hebben, omdat je door meerdere subdoelstellingen doelstellingen te stellen je dus eigenlijk suboptimaal aan het sturen bent'* (respondent 16, personal interview, March 11, 2015). Almost all business interest organizations indicate the European Union should protect the European and global competitive position of internationally operating companies. An equal level playing field should be created. According to most of the more energy intensive business stakeholders a single CO₂-target and compensation mechanisms for carbon leakage sensitive industries should be introduced to protect this global competitive position of companies. As one respondent puts it: *'Voor ons is het standpunt altijd zo geweest, voor de CO₂-reductie, dat*

hoe ver of niet ver je daarin kunt gaan, hangt af van of je de concurrentiepositie van je internationaal concurrerende industrie kan borgen in zo'n scenario (respondent 3, personal interview, February 2, 2015).

On the contrary however, the more environmental business and diffuse interest organizations argue for a binding triple target. These respondents suggest that the three goals correlate and that a specific goal for greenhouse gas reduction correlates with specific goals for renewable energy and energy savings. Therefore they do not oppose to and mostly actively plead for a binding triple target. As one respondent puts it: *'Alle drie bindend en alle drie op lidstaatniveau. Ik kan met de beste wil van de wereld niet bedenken hoe je een doel afspreekt dat op Europees niveau bindend is zoals de duurzame energiedoelen als je dat vervolgens niet door vertaald naar lidstaten'* (respondent 14, personal interview, February 19, 2015). They argue the European Union should agree on a binding triple goal translated into member state targets. They mention this ensures that an equal level playing field within Europe is created. A few respondents furthermore support a binding triple target within Europe because this ultimately puts European industries at a global competitive advantage: *'Want als de Europese economie in verhouding tot de rest van de wereld concurrerend wil blijven moet je gewoon innoveren. Want op andere terreinen winnen wij nooit'* (respondent 14, personal interview, February 19, 2015).

Large diversity moreover exists in to what extent and how the European Union should reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. Some of the more energy intensive business stakeholders refer to the negative consequences a binding CO₂-target could have for the international competitive position of companies. Some of the more energy intensive business representatives see 40 percent greenhouse gas emission reduction as problematic when no sufficient mechanisms exist to compensate energy-intensive companies or similar targets in other competitive countries are absent. Nevertheless, almost all business and environmental stakeholders and the regions support binding CO₂-reduction targets from at least 40 and some even advocate for a percentage of 55 percent. The stakeholders support binding targets for member states, *'(...) want anders wordt het een hele wazige en diffuse toestand'* (respondent 9, personal interview, February 9, 2015).

As stated above, most of the more energy intensive industries strongly oppose to a binding renewable energy target because they argue it interferes with a greenhouse gas emissions reduction target. However, the more environmental oriented business and diffuse interest groups are strongly in favor of a binding renewable energy target. They advocate for a binding renewable energy target of 45 percent. This European goal should be translated into

member state targets, because otherwise the European target will not be realised. One respondent states: *'Je hebt er niks aan als je alleen maar op EU-niveau een doel hebt, want dan gaan lidstaten naar mekaar zitten wijzen. Kijk, een Europese Unie heeft geen macht om iets af te dwingen dat dat daadwerkelijk gebeurt'* (respondent 13, personal interview, February 18, 2015).

Also previously stated, some of the more energy intensive industries furthermore strongly oppose to a binding energy savings target because this would interfere with a greenhouse gas emissions reduction target. On the contrary, the more environmental oriented business, diffuse interest groups and regions strongly support a binding energy savings target. Some actors see energy savings as most important because of its positive consequences for employment and others because it contributes to mitigating climate change. Most of these more environmental oriented business and diffuse interest groups argue for a binding energy savings target of 40 percent.

Most respondents indicate that the EU Emissions Trading System could be effective in contributing to diminishing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions. However, almost all respondents indicate that its current design is insufficient in realizing CO₂-reductions. As one respondent puts it: *'Het principe is goed. De uitwerking ervan is faliekant fout gegaan'* (respondent 13, personal interview, February 18, 2015). Another respondent formulates it similarly: *'(...) als marktmechanisme faalt het wel gigantisch'* (respondent 14, personal interview, February 19, 2015). One respondent even indicates the Emissions Trading System should be abandoned: *'(...) wij denken dat het op sterven na dood is en toe aan euthanasie, het hele ETS'* (respondent 12, personal interview, February 11, 2015).

Most respondents indicate the ETS should be changed to become effective. Some of the more energy intensive industries argue it should be changed so that it better protects the competitive position of internationally operating companies to prevent carbon leakage. Some respondents indicate a system of allocation supply or dynamic allocation should be introduced. Other business interest organizations as well as environmental groups state that the price for emission allowances should significantly increase by once on short-term and annually decreasing the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions allowances.

5.1.2 Domestic stakeholders' lobbying activities

To get their interests represented almost all respondents to some extent lobbied the Dutch government. Some of these respondents indicate to have contact with civil servants from the ministries involved, but did not actively lobby because their interests seemed to be quite well

represented. Other interest groups did actively lobby the Dutch government (quote number one, Annex-VI). These interest organizations sent formal letters to the Dutch Cabinet and House of Representatives to make their position known. Additionally they had meetings and informal contact with politicians and civil servants to represent their interests (quote number two, Annex-VI).

Only a few respondents directly lobbied the EU institutions. The large majority of interest groups lobbied the European Union via their European counterparts. They name four reasons. Especially the more environmental oriented stakeholders see their limited amount of resources as one of the most important reasons (quote number three, Annex-VI). A second and third reason form the larger legitimacy of European and limited authority of national interest organizations (quote number four, Annex-VI). A fourth reason is satisfaction with the EU institutions' policy standpoints (quote number five, Annex-VI).

5.2 The subjective process of interest representation

This inquiry analyses the Dutch domestic stakeholders' perceptions of to what extent their interests are represented to determine the subjective process of interest representation.

5.2.1 Domestic stakeholders' perceptions of impact own lobbying activities

The respondents indicate the Dutch government is open for their input. They name three main reasons. The first reason is the information and expertise they can provide the regime with (quote number six, Annex-VI). A second and related reason is that the interest organizations provide the Dutch government with a broad spectrum of facts (quote number seven, Annex-VI). The third main reason is the legitimacy an interest organization has (quote number eight, Annex-VI).

Both business as diffuse interest organizations indicate that their lobbying activities have had an impact on the Dutch government's policy position to some extent. Most respondents mention their lobbying activities probably have had impact, but that this is difficult to prove. As one respondent puts it: *'Nou, natuurlijk is er enige invloed geweest. (...) Maar hoe groot die invloed is. Het is toch een dossier dat heel duidelijk in de achterkamertjes vorm heeft gekregen'* (respondent 9, personal interview, February 9, 2015). Some respondents have a more pessimistic view about the impact of their own lobbying activities. One respondent mentions: *'Je hebt altijd invloed. Als je wat roept, ze horen het. Het doet altijd wel iets. Maar het is best wel weinig. Een kabinetsstandpunt beïnvloeden, of zelfs dat naar Europa moet worden uitgedragen, waar tienduizend mensen roepen wat ze vinden en mensen toch wel ongeveer weten wat wij vinden, daar is de impact vrij klein'* (respondent 5, personal

interview, February 5, 2015). Other business and environmental interest organizations have a more optimistic view about the impact of their lobbying activities. As one respondent says: *'Ik denk dat dat twee onderdelen zijn waar de invloed van (...) op de positie van de Nederlandse regering wel te onderscheiden is'* (respondent 1, personal interview, January 30, 2015).

5.2.2 Domestic stakeholders' perceptions of interest representation by the Dutch regime

Only a few business stakeholders mention the Dutch government's policy position (before the motions adopted by the House of Representatives) reasonably represents their interests. As one respondent states: *'Ik vind dat ze [onze belangen] heel redelijk vertegenwoordigd zijn. Ook omdat voor een belangrijk deel de opvattingen die de regering aanvankelijk innam al vrij dicht lag bij wat wij wilden'* (respondent 1, personal interview, January 30, 2015). However, a large majority of both more energy intensive as more environmental oriented business and environmental stakeholders states the Dutch government has represented their interests insufficiently.

Most of the more energy intensive business stakeholders supported the Dutch government originally aimed at a single target. As one respondent puts it: *'De positie van de Nederlandse overheid voordat die moties er kwamen vonden wij goed en realistisch'* (respondent 16, personal interview, March 11, 2015). However, most of the more energy intensive business interest organizations disagree that the Dutch government from some point on had to plead for the renewable energy and energy savings targets from the European Commission. As one respondent puts it: *'Als je het hebt over standpuntbepaling ten opzichte van de plannen van de single target versus triple target, hadden wij liever gezien dat het kabinet vast had gehouden aan de eerdere standpunten die gericht waren op een single target. Dus daar zijn we niet tevreden over'* (respondent 3, personal interview, February 2, 2015).

The more environmental business and the diffuse interest organizations are strongly dissatisfied that the Dutch government only from such a very late stadium on advocated for a triple target. One respondent states: *'Dit is typisch zo'n dossier waarin Nederland echt helemaal achteraan loopt. En alles probeert te traineren en de mond vol heeft van allerlei ambitie maar als puntje bij paaltje komt slaat het gewoon helemaal nergens op wat ze zeggen'* (respondent 13, personal interview, February 18, 2015). Moreover, these stakeholders indicate that the percentages of the greenhouse gas, renewable energy and energy savings targets the Dutch government advocated for are by far not ambitious enough. As one respondent formulates it: *'Wij vinden dat er meer moet worden duurzaam opgewekt, meer energie moet worden bespaard. Dat de doelstellingen ambitieuzer moeten zijn. (...) Voor*

Nederland zelf is het heel slap eigenlijk. Heel slap. Dat moet een stuk ambitieuzer' (respondent 10, personal interview, February 10, 2015).

The respondents differ in their perception of to what extent the Dutch government has influenced the policy outcome. Some stakeholders indicate not to know what the impact of the Dutch government has been on the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. One respondent says: *'Dat is natuurlijk heel moeilijk aan te geven. Wat nou precies de invloed van wie wanneer is geweest. Het enige wat je kunt constateren is dat het aansluit bij wat Nederland wil (...)'* (respondent 4, personal interview, February 4, 2015). According to some of the more energy intensive business stakeholders the influence of the Dutch regime on the greenhouse gas, renewable energy and energy savings targets has been limited. As one respondent mentions: *'Ik denk dat dat beperkt is. Ik denk dat daar de grote lidstaten een veel zwaarder impact hebben gehad'* (respondent 16, personal interview, March 11, 2015).

The more environmental oriented business and the diffuse interest organizations on the other hand state the Dutch government has had considerable negative impact on the policy outcome. One respondent comments: (...) *'wat betreft duurzame energie en energiebesparing hebben zij gewoon knalhard op de rem gestaan totdat zij door het parlement werden gedwongen om in de laatste fase hun standpunt een beetje te wijzigen. Nederland heeft gewoon in een heleboel discussies de kant van Polen en Engeland gekozen en dat is anders dan het beeld wat veel Nederlanders van zichzelf hebben. Die denken dat wij super goed zijn of zo. Bullshit'* (respondent 14, personal interview, February 19, 2015). Another respondent formulates it similarly: *'En het is mede aan Nederland te danken dat het allemaal zo ambitieus is'* (respondent 13, personal interview, February 18, 2015).

To determine the objective outcome of interest representation, this research compares the policy positions of the Dutch domestic stakeholders with the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. As the domestic stakeholders' standpoints (section 5.1.1) and the EU 2030 policy framework (section 4.3.1) have already been described, no additional information is described here. The analysis chapter examines the objective outcome of interest representation.

5.3 The subjective outcome of interest representation

To inquire the subjective outcome of interest representation, this research analyses domestic stakeholders' and the national government's perception of to what extent the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy represents their interests.

5.3.1 Domestic stakeholders' perceptions

Large variety exists in how the domestic stakeholders perceive this EU policy decision. Most of the more energy intensive business interest groups are reasonably positive about the binding CO₂-target, carbon leakage protection passages and the renewable energy and energy savings targets are not binding on member state level. As one respondent puts it: *'Dus dit is gewoon een pakket wat goed te doen is, waar hard aan gewerkt moet worden maar waarvan we niet zeggen van: dit gaat hem niet worden'* (respondent 9, personal interview, February 9, 2015). Although they are happy these goals are not translated into binding member state targets, these more energy intensive business interest groups disagree with the fact that the policy framework contains European Union renewable energy and energy savings targets. Some of the other more energy intensive business interest groups have a less positive view of the European Union 2030 policy framework. One respondent says: *'(...) je ziet dat er tal van mitsen en maren worden opgeschreven. (...) het is een beetje ambitie uitspreken met de rem erop'* (respondent 1, personal interview, January 30, 2015).

Several business stakeholders indicate how the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy represents their interests depends on its implementation. As one respondent says: *'En vervolgens is de vraag: hoe worden die op Europees niveau uitgewerkt en vervolgens in Nederland uitgewerkt'* (respondent 4, personal interview, February 4, 2015). One respondent even fears these European goals will eventually be translated into binding member state targets: *'Wij zien dat de Europese Commissie niet echt genegen is om naar de industrie te luisteren. Die gaat, als een redelijke mammoettanker probeert zij zijn zin door te drijven. Die 27 procent voor energie efficiency zijn we niet gerust op omdat wij al vaker de Commissie dingen hebben zien doen van: we gaan dat eerst generiek doen en dan tegelijkertijd wordt er opgestart om te evalueren of het voldoende snel gaat en voor je het weet ligt er alsnog een doelstelling op lidstaatniveau aan ten grondslag'* (respondent 16, personal interview, March 11, 2015).

Almost all more environmental oriented business and the diffuse interest organizations argue the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy does not represent their interests well. They indicate the percentages of the greenhouse gas, renewable energy and energy savings targets are too low and are especially disappointed that the renewable energy goal is not translated into binding member state targets. As one respondent formulates it: *'Het schiet grandioos tekort. (...) je schuift de rekening naar achter. Je geeft niet een signaal af aan de wereld dat wij echt grote stappen willen maken. Dan is het helemaal niet spectaculair als je het zo bekijkt en op het gebied van energiebesparing en*

duurzame energie is het echt verbijsterend. Je kunt het niet menen dat je in 2030 op 27 procent duurzame energie wil zitten, want we zitten in 2020 al op 20 procent. Dus het tempo gaat dan zo, dat is minder dan business as usual. Dus het is een grandioze gemiste kans' (respondent 14, personal interview, February 19, 2015). Another respondent formulates the general feeling of these stakeholders adequately: *'Het moet gewoon allemaal ambitieuzer'* (respondent 8, personal interview, February 9, 2015).

Most stakeholders think the evaluation passage in the 2030 policy framework for climate and energy will not be used to downgrade or upgrade the targets of the policy framework and therefore do not allocate much value to it. One respondent mentions: *'Die is er volgens mij op verzoek vanuit Oost-Europa in gekomen. (...) Ik denk dat het niks betekent'* (respondent 16, personal interview, March 11, 2015). Some of the more environmental oriented business and the diffuse interest organizations nevertheless are somewhat afraid the passage will be used to downgrade the environmental goals. As one respondent puts it: *'Kijk, dit kan twee kanten op. En dat is, het is fijn als dit uiteindelijk aangewend wordt om het ambitieuzer te maken. Dan ben ik er blij mee. Maar het is rampzalig als er straks allerlei invloeden in Europa gaan zeggen: nou, er kwam al niks uit in Parijs, laten wij onze doelstellingen maar naar beneden bij stellen, want anders lopen we weer voorop. Dat moeten we ook niet hebben. Ik vind het slap. Het toont geen leiderschap'* (respondent 13, personal interview, February 18, 2015). However, another respondent says: *'Ik kan me niet voorstellen dat het nog zwakker wordt dan het nu al is'* (respondent 10, personal interview, February 10, 2015).

5.3.2 The Dutch government's perception

The interviewed civil servants indicate that while the best attempts were made it was not possible to fulfil the motion-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber and the motion-Ouwehand as there was insufficient support within the Council for this position. One civil servant states no support existed within the European Union for a renewable energy target on the member state level: *'Dat hebben we niet binnen gehaald. Dat lag er gewoon aan dat we alleen stonden'* (respondent 17, personal interview, March 20, 2015).

The interviewed civil servants mention to be satisfied with how the Dutch government represented the interests of the domestic environmental policy stakeholders on the European level. As one civil servant puts it: *'Voor ons was de belangrijkste discussie hoe je die doelstelling [CO₂-reductie] verdeelt over de lidstaten. Voor Nederland was het financieel het gunstigste geweest om dat helemaal volgens het principe van kosteneffectiviteit te doen. Maar*

dat was totaal onhaalbaar en totaal niet solidair. We zijn nu uitgekomen op een model waar in ieder geval straks met onze doelstelling wel rekening wordt gehouden met wat kosteneffectief is. Perfect. Of alle stakeholders dat zullen zien is natuurlijk de vraag. Onze milieuorganisaties willen vanzelfsprekend het meest ambitieuze doel voor Nederland wat maar mogelijk is. Maar als je een Europees doel hebt, dan op het moment dat Nederland een hoger doel krijgt, doet een ander land wat minder. Dus voor het klimaat win je daar niks mee. Onze bedrijven zullen misschien willen dat we naar een lager doel toe zouden zijn gegaan. Maar dat is een niet begaanbare weg.’ (respondent 6, personal interview, February 6, 2015).

The civil servants indicate to be satisfied with the 2030 policy framework for climate and energy because it is both ambitious environmental policy as well as that it represents business interests. One respondent says: *‘Als je kijkt naar het doel wat in de raadsconclusies is opgenomen hebben we een goed bod richting die onderhandelingen. (...) En als je kijkt naar wat het betekent voor Nederland qua maatregelen straks, dan even onder voorbehoud van hoe het wordt uitgewerkt, ziet het er naar uit dat dat kosteneffectief mogelijk is. Dus ook de belangen van het bedrijfsleven zijn daar dan mee tegemoet gekomen’* (respondent 6, personal interview, February 6, 2015). Another civil servant formulates a general conclusion regarding the policy framework: *‘Maar uiteindelijk, vanuit Nederlands overheids perspectief, vanuit beleid, de regering denkt van wat er nu op tafel ligt, dat het een gebalanceerd pakket is waar we redelijk tevreden over kunnen zijn. Ook als je kijkt naar dit hele proces, denk ik dat er best wel mensen waren die niet hadden gedacht dat dit er uit zou of zou kunnen komen’* (respondent 17, personal interview, March 20, 2015). The next chapter analyses the in this chapter presented results.

6. Analysis

This section analyses the objective and subjective process and outcome of representing Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests by the Dutch government in the European Union 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.

6.1 The objective process of interest representation

It firstly examines the process of interest representation by comparing the Dutch domestic stakeholders' positions with the national government's and the EU institutions' standpoints regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy.

6.1.1: The European Commission policy proposal

The European Commission policy proposal does neither fully represents the Dutch domestic more energy intensive business nor sufficiently represents the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest groups. However, it better represents the Dutch domestic more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests than the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups' interests.

This can for a large part be explained by the triple target formulation. The EC proposal for a triple target with a binding greenhouse gas reduction target on the member-state level, binding renewable energy target on the European level and an indicative target of energy savings on the European level fulfils the more energy intensive business interests better than the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interests. Although the renewable energy and energy savings targets are on the European level and not on the member-state level, the more energy intensive business interests prefer to only have a single target on CO₂-reduction. Nevertheless, only a binding CO₂-target on the member state level satisfies the more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests reasonably because the renewable energy and energy savings targets are not translated into member-state targets and therefore difficult to enforce. This does not sufficiently represent the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups' interests on the other hand because they prefer to have binding renewable energy and energy savings targets on the member state level.

Furthermore, the percentages of the CO₂-reduction, renewable energy and energy savings targets do not coincide with most Dutch domestic stakeholders' demands. The EC proposal of 40 Percent greenhouse gas emissions reduction is for some of the more energy intensive business stakeholders acceptable and for some of the other more energy intensive business stakeholders too ambitious. However, some other more energy intensive and the

more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders prefer a more ambitious CO₂-target of 45 and sometimes even 55 percent. Most of the more energy intensive business stakeholders prefer a single target and therefore do not have a policy position regarding the percentages for renewable energy and energy savings. The EC proposal of 27 percent renewable energy and 25 percent energy savings is by far not ambitious enough for the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest groups.

Moreover, the EC proposal to change the ETS does not satisfy the Dutch domestic stakeholders' demands. Some of the more energy intensive business interest groups advocate for a different allocation system than the European Commission proposes. Other more energy intensive and the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders argue the CO₂-price should significantly increase by once on short-term and annually stronger than the EC proposes decreasing the amount of greenhouse gas emissions.

6.1.2: The Dutch government's standpoint

The Dutch government's standpoint neither fully represents the Dutch domestic more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests nor sufficiently represents the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups' interests. This research finds evidence that supports and evidence that rejects Levy's claim that business interests dominate a country's negotiation position (1997: 64). Namely, originally business considerations were more dominant but eventually environmental arguments were more present in the Dutch government's policy position.

Initially the Dutch regime's standpoint better represented the more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests than the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups' interests. The main reason is that the Dutch government regarded the CO₂-target as leading and did not plead for binding renewable energy and energy savings targets on the member-state level. A leading CO₂-target represents the more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests because they advocate for a single target, although they do not agree with renewable energy and energy savings targets on EU-level. Nevertheless, because binding European targets are difficult to enforce, this position reasonably represents the more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests. The European renewable energy and energy savings targets strongly do not represent the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups' interests because they advocate for a binding triple target on the member-state level.

The percentages of the greenhouse gas emission reductions, renewable energy and energy savings targets do not coincide with most Dutch domestic stakeholders' demands. At least 40 percent CO₂-reduction is for some of the more energy intensive business stakeholders too ambitious but for other more energy intensive business stakeholders acceptable. However, other of the more energy intensive and the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders prefer a more ambitious CO₂-target of sometimes even 55 percent. Most of the more energy intensive business stakeholders prefer a single target and therefore do not have a policy position regarding the percentages for renewable energy and energy savings. The Dutch government's standpoint of 27 percent renewable energy and 25 percent energy savings is by far not ambitious enough for the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest groups.

Regarding the EU Emissions Trading System the Dutch government represented the Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests quite well because most stakeholders support the Dutch energy agreement in which a position on ETS is formulated. As one civil servant puts it: *'Het energieakkoord is leidend op dit moment voor alle Commissievoorstellen. Dusdanig dat de visie van de industrie, de groene partijen, I en M, EZ, en van iedereen die erbij was, vervangen zit in dat energieakkoord. Met het energieakkoord in onze achterzak hebben we de goedkeuring van die andere partijen om die afspraken die in het energieakkoord staan over ETS uit te voeren'* (respondent 7, personal interview, February 6, 2015).

Eventually the Dutch Cabinet's policy standpoint regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy represented the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest groups better and the more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests less adequate than in the original position. The motion-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber and the motion-Ouwehand ensured the Dutch government had to advocate for a renewable energy target on member-state level and support or at least not resist the EC targets on renewable energy and energy savings. This represents most of the more energy intensive business stakeholders' interests less adequate and the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups' interests better. However, the more environmental oriented business and the environmental groups advocate for way more ambitious renewable energy and energy savings percentages than the Dutch government. Consequently, both business as environmental interests are not sufficiently represented by the Dutch government.

6.1.3 Dutch Domestic stakeholders' lobbying activities

The representation process supports elements of the European integration theories of intergovernmentalism as well as multi-level governance. The national government is the most important access point for domestic interest groups. Almost all Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders directed their lobbying activities towards the Dutch national government. Only a few respondents indicated to have directly lobbied the EU institutions. These findings are in accordance with elements of the European integration theory of intergovernmentalism, which states that regimes remain the ultimate decision-makers and subnational actors' interests are solely represented by the state (Fairbrass and Jordan, 2001: 500).

On the other hand, although only a few domestic stakeholders mention to lobby the EU institutions directly, the majority of domestic stakeholders indicate to indirectly lobby the EU institutions via their European counterparts. This inquiry thus finds that domestic stakeholders also outflank their national government and lobby the EU institutions (although via their European counterparts). These findings do not support the theory of intergovernmentalism but support elements of the theory of multi-level governance, which states that national interest groups could shift their attention to the European level (Poloni-Staudinger, 2008: 551; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2008: 1267).

6.2 The subjective process of interest representation

6.2.1 Domestic stakeholders' perceptions of impact own lobbying activities

Previous articles come to different conclusions whether business or diffuse interest groups have been more successful in lobbying the EU (compare Bunea, 2013; Klüver, 2012; Chalmers, 2011). Both the business as the diffuse interest organizations indicate in similar terms to have had an impact on the Dutch government's position. Therefore, this research states that the domestic concentrated and environmental stakeholders perceived to be comparably successful in lobbying the Dutch government.

6.2.2 Domestic stakeholders' perceptions of interest representation by the Dutch regime

A large majority of the more energy intensive, the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest organizations are dissatisfied with the Dutch regime's policy position regarding the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. The motion-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber and the motion-Ouwehand explain this negative view of the Dutch government's standpoint. The more energy intensive industries disagree with the triple target these motions aim at. The more environmental oriented business and the environmental

stakeholders are unhappy that the Dutch government's position changed only in such a late stadium and state the greenhouse gas reduction, renewable energy and energy savings targets are not ambitious enough.

This discontent of a large majority of stakeholders can furthermore be explained by the process of interest representation. The Dutch government tries to concentrate a large amount of and often contradicting interests in a policy position that meets all stakeholders' demands. One respondent formulates this process as follows: *'Zij [de overheid] weten wat voor ons belangrijk is, wat voor VNO-NCW belangrijk is, wat voor de milieubeweging belangrijk is en zoeken daar een soort tussenweg in die voor de regeringspartijen en de maatschappelijke partijen aanvaardbaar is'* (respondent 1, personal interview, January 30, 2015). It is however highly problematic to formulate a policy position that coincides with all groups' interests. This is especially the case in environmental policy where environmental and business interests clearly conflict. The process of interest representation thus inevitably leads to dissatisfaction with stakeholders because a compromise has to be found. One respondent recognizes this: *'Dat is nou eenmaal inherent aan belangenbehartiging in een land. Je krijgt nooit honderd procent je zin. Dat is het spanningsveld waarbinnen je opereert'* (respondent 11, personal interview, February 11, 2015).

6.3 The objective outcome of interest representation

Previous inquiries find that business interest groups have had considerable impact on the outcome of international environmental policy decisions (Levy, 1997: 55; Newell and Paterson, 1998: 695). This research contributes to these interest representation theories by examining to what extent domestic business and diffuse interests are represented in EU environmental policy.

In this context it finds that the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy better represents the more energy intensive oriented business than the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders. The binding CO₂-target of 40 percent on the member state level and the compensation mechanisms to protect the competitive position of internationally operating companies corresponds reasonably with the more energy intensive interest organization's policy standpoints. Furthermore, the binding renewable energy target on the European instead of the member state level and an indicative instead of a binding energy savings target coincide with the more energy intensive stakeholders' policy positions. On the other hand, the ETS modifications do not sufficiently correspond with most

of the more energy intensive oriented business interest organizations because they aim for other modifications than is decided upon.

The binding CO₂-target of 40 percent on the member state level does not sufficiently represent the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders' interests because they aim for more ambitious CO₂-reduction percentages. Similarly, the binding renewable energy target on the European instead of the member state level and an indicative instead of a binding energy savings target on the European instead of the member state level does not coincide with the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders' interests. Namely, they aim for an ambitious and binding triple target on the member state level. The ETS modifications also do not correspond with their interests because these stakeholders aim for ETS measures that on short term significantly increase the CO₂-price.

6.4 The subjective outcome of interest representation

The Dutch government and the Dutch domestic stakeholders perceive the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy differently. The Dutch government is positive about the outcome of the 2030 environmental policy negotiations (Koenders, 2014). Some of the more energy intensive oriented business, the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders mostly have a distinguished and more negative perception. This can be explained by their focus on specific interests where the Dutch government focuses on an overarching interest. Aiming to represent the general interest irreducibly leads to less adequately represented specific interests. Similarly, the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy is too ambitious for some of the more energy intensive oriented business and not ambitious enough for the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders. The next chapter presents a conclusion of the main findings of this research.

7. Conclusion

The earth's climate is changing. To mitigate this observed climate change the European Council in October, 2014, decided upon EU environmental policy goals for the year 2030 (European Council, 2014: 1). This inquiry examines to what extent the Dutch domestic stakeholders' interests have been represented by the Dutch national government and the European Union in the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. This research concludes the Dutch government has neither represented sufficiently most of the more energy intensive oriented business nor reasonably the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders' specific interests. This inquiry furthermore finds the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy represents reasonably the more energy intensive oriented business and insufficiently the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders.

During the process of the 2030 environmental policy negotiations the Dutch government's standpoint represented better originally the more energy intensive business and eventually the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders. The Dutch regime initially aimed at only a binding CO₂-target on the member state level and a binding renewable energy target on the European level. Although the more energy intensive business stakeholders are against a renewable energy target, this reasonably represents their interests because a binding target on EU level is difficult to enforce.

Ultimately (resulting from the motion-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber) the Dutch government however also advocated for a binding renewable energy target on the member state level. This does not adequately represent the more energy intensive oriented business but better represents the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest groups that argue for a binding triple target on the member state level. Nevertheless, these stakeholders advocate for way more ambitious greenhouse gas reduction, renewable energy and energy savings targets than the Dutch government. Consequently, neither most of the more energy intensive business nor the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders' interests are sufficiently represented by the Dutch national government.

A large majority of the more energy intensive, the more environmental oriented business and the environmental interest organizations perceive the Dutch regime's policy position as negative for their interests. The motion-Van Tongeren-Dik-Faber and the motion-Ouwehand explain this. The more energy intensive industries disagree with the triple target

these motions aim at. The more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders are unhappy that the Dutch government's position changed only in such a late stadium and state the greenhouse gas reduction, renewable energy and energy savings targets are not ambitious enough. This discontent might be inherent to interest representation. Concentrating a large amount of and often contradicting interests in a policy compromise inevitably does not coincide fully with all groups' interests. This is especially valid in environmental policy-making where traditional fossil-fuel business interests clearly conflict with environmental interests.

The outcome of the 2030 policy negotiations represents reasonably the more energy intensive oriented business and insufficiently the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders. The binding CO₂-target of 40 percent on the member state level and the compensation mechanisms to protect the competitive position of internationally operating companies correspond reasonably with the more energy intensive interest organization's policy standpoints. Furthermore, the binding renewable energy target on the EU instead of the member state level and an indicative instead of a binding EU energy savings target coincide with the more energy intensive stakeholders' policy positions. The more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders' interests are insufficiently represented as they advocate for a way more ambitious triple greenhouse gas reduction, renewable energy and energy savings target on the member state level.

The Dutch government is positive about the EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy. The more environmental oriented business, the environmental and, although the policy outcome reasonably represents their interests, even some of the more energy intensive oriented business stakeholders have a distinguished and more negative perception of the policy outcome. The EU 2030 policy framework for climate and energy is too ambitious for some of the more energy intensive oriented business and not ambitious enough for the more environmental oriented business and the environmental stakeholders. This can also be explained by their focus on specific interests instead of an overarching interest. Concentrating a large diversity of contradicting interests into a policy compromise that fully represents all stakeholders' specific interests is, especially in environmental policy-making, nearly unfeasible.

7.1 Limitations

This inquiry is a single case study. Consequently, it could be that the Dutch government excellently represents the Dutch domestic groups' specific interests during other European

Union environmental policy-making negotiations. The findings of this research therefore do not indicate that the Dutch government structurally insufficiently represents most Dutch domestic stakeholders' specific interests. Furthermore, the qualitative nature of this research prevents statements regarding the degree to which the Dutch national government represented the interests of the broad spectrum of Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders. Moreover, due to the limited amount of time for writing this thesis important interest groups like citizens, politicians, municipal governance institutions and the agricultural sector are excluded in the sample of this inquiry. The findings of this research therefore cannot be generalised to all Dutch domestic environmental policy stakeholders. Also, this research analyses interest representation in EU environmental policy. Consequently, the findings of this research cannot be generalized to interest representation processes in other EU policy-making fields. Additionally, the findings and conclusions of this inquiry could be influenced by the role of the researcher during the processes of gathering the information through holding the interviews and interpreting this information. Nevertheless, this author has been conscious of its own role during all stages of writing this thesis. Consequently, the outcome of this inquiry has not been significantly negatively influenced.

7.2 Recommendations for future research

To examine to what extent the Dutch government structurally represents the Dutch domestic stakeholders' specific interests in European Union environmental policy, it would be interesting to analyse other EU environmental policy-making processes and outcomes. Furthermore, researchers could examine how the Dutch government represents domestic stakeholders' interests in other EU-policy fields. This facilitates considering differences and similarities various policy fields have for the extent to which the Dutch government is able to represent domestic stakeholders' interests. Identifying the factors that explain the success or failure of interest representation can be used to improve the representation of domestic groups' interests by the Dutch regime. Similarly, future inquiries could be directed towards studying to what extent other European Union member states represent their domestic stakeholders' interests in European Union environmental policy and other policy fields. It could then be compared which EU member states are most capable in concentrating diffuse interests into policy standpoints that are best acceptable to the domestic stakeholders. Moreover, causes and circumstances could be identified that explain interest representation success or failure.

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9. Appendices

9.1 Annex-I: Topicijst voor interviews stakeholders

Korte introductie stakeholderorganisatie en functie geïnterviewde

- Doel en activiteiten

Belangenvertegenwoordiging gedurende het proces van beleidsvorming m.b.t. het Europese Unie beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

1. Beleidsstandpunt stakeholder

- Standpunt m.b.t. het Europese Unie klimaatbeleidskadervoorstel voor 2030: reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing

2. Acties stakeholder

- Lobbyactiviteiten: niveau en tactieken
- Invloed lobbyactiviteiten

3. Perceptie stakeholder van beleidsstandpunt Nederlandse overheid

- Perceptie beleidsstandpunt van de Nederlandse overheid m.b.t. het Europese Unie klimaatbeleidsvoorstel voor 2030: reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing
- Betrokkenheid bij en invloed op Nederlandse beleidsstandpunt
- Perceptie succes belangenvertegenwoordiging door Nederlandse overheid

4. Perceptie stakeholder van beleidsstandpunt Europese Unie instituties

- Perceptie beleidsstandpunt van de instituties van de Europese Unie met betrekking tot het Europese Unie klimaatbeleidsvoorstel voor 2030
- Perceptie acties EU-instituties
- Invloed beleidsproces EU

Belangenvertegenwoordiging m.b.t. de uitkomst van het Europese Unie beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

1. Perceptie stakeholder van EU beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

- Perceptie EU beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030: reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing
- Perceptie belangenvertegenwoordiging door de EU

2. Acties stakeholder

- Invloed op beleidsuitkomst EU

9.2 Annex-II: Topiclijst interview ministeries Infrastructuur & Milieu en Economische Zaken

Korte introductie vertegenwoordiging Nederlandse belangen in het EU beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

- Procedure, betrokken ministeries/stakeholders

Belangenvertegenwoordiging gedurende het proces van beleidsvorming m.b.t. het Europese Unie beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

1. Beleidsstandpuntbepaling Nederlandse overheid

- Beleidsstandpunt m.b.t. het Europese klimaatbeleid voor 2030: reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing
- Betrokkenheid stakeholders bij positiebepaling
- Invloed stakeholders op Nederlandse beleidsstandpunt

2. Acties Nederlandse overheid

- Acties overheid op Europees niveau
- Perceptie succes belangenvertegenwoordiging door Nederlandse overheid

3. Europese Unie instituties

- Perceptie beleidsstandpunt van de instituties van de Europese Unie met betrekking tot het Europese klimaatbeleid voor de periode 2030
- Perceptie acties EU-instituties

Belangenvertegenwoordiging m.b.t. de uitkomst van het Europese Unie beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

1. EU beleidsuitkomst

- Perceptie beleidsuitkomst EU: reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing
- Perceptie belangenvertegenwoordiging door de EU
- Invloed Nederland op beleidsuitkomst EU

2. Reactie overheid op beleidsuitkomst

- Formele reactie

9.3 Annex-III: Topiclijst Interview Permanente Vertegenwoordiging Milieu- en Natuurbeleid

Korte introductie vertegenwoordiging Nederlandse belangen in het EU beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

- Procedure, verloop onderhandelingen, rol permanente vertegenwoordiging

Belangenvertegenwoordiging gedurende de onderhandelingen voor het Europese Unie beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

1. Inzet Nederlandse overheid
 - Onderhandelingsmandaat m.b.t. reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing
2. Onderhandelingen
 - Acties overheid op Europees niveau
 - Draagvlak en coalitievorming
 - Verloop besluitvorming
 - Perceptie succes belangenvertegenwoordiging door Nederlandse overheid
3. Europese Unie instituties
 - Perceptie invloed EU-instituties

Belangenvertegenwoordiging in de uitkomst van het Europese Unie beleidskader voor klimaat en energie voor 2030

1. EU beleidsuitkomst
 - Perceptie beleidsuitkomst EU: reductie in broeikasgasemissies; vormgeving ETS; doelen voor hernieuwbare energie en energiebesparing
 - Invloed Nederland op beleidsuitkomst EU
2. Reactie overheid op beleidsuitkomst
 - Formele reactie

- 9.4 Annex-IV: Lijst met codes interviews stakeholders
 - 1. Standpunt m.b.t. EU 2030 beleidskader klimaat en energie
 - 1.1 Algemene positie
 - 1.2 Broeikasgasreductie
 - 1.3 Hernieuwbare energy
 - 1.4 Energiebesparing
 - 1.5 ETS
 - 1.6 Evaluatiepassage
 - 1.7 Internationale context

 - 2. Lobbyactiviteiten
 - 2.1 Niveau en instituties
 - 2.2 Overheid open
 - 2.3 Impact op overheidsstandpunt

 - 3. Perceptie belangenvertegenwoordiging door Nederlandse overheid
 - 3.1 Standpunt overheid
 - 3.2 Impact acties overheid

 - 4. Perceptie EU 2030 beleidskader klimaat en energie
 - 4.1 Winstpunt
 - 4.2 Gemiste kans

9.5 Annex-V: Lijst met codes interviews ambtenaren Rijksoverheid

1. Standpunt Rijksoverheid m.b.t. EU 2030 beleidskader klimaat en energie

1.1 Algemene positie

1.2 Broeikasgasreductie

1.3 Hernieuwbare energy

1.4 Energiebesparing

1.5 ETS

1.6 Evaluatiepassage

1.7 Internationale context

2. Standpuntbepaling Rijksoverheid

3. Perceptie vertegenwoordiging Nederlandse belangen

4. Perceptie uitkomst EU 2030 beleidskader klimaat en energie

4.1 Winstpunt

4.2 Gemiste kans

9.6 Annex-VI: List of quotes

Quote number one: *'Dus als je kijkt naar de lobbyactiviteiten, gingen die heel sterk naar het pakket zoals dat aanvankelijk werd gepresenteerd in de richting van de Tweede Kamer om het kabinetsstandpunt te beïnvloeden'* (respondent 1, personal interview, January 30, 2015).

Quote number two: *'Wij hebben een heel aantal reguliere contacten zowel met Kamerleden als ambtenaren waarin we dit soort punten onder de aandacht brengen. Veel ingewikkelder dan dat is het eigenlijk niet'* (respondent 3, personal interview, February 2, 2015).

Quote number three: *'We hebben daar nog geen middelen voor'* (respondent 8, personal interview, February 9, 2015).

Quote number four: *'Nou, wil je een deuk in een pakje boter slaan, moet je natuurlijk wel body hebben'* (respondent 9, personal interview, February 9, 2015).

Quote number five: *'Omdat het eigenlijk wel ging zoals wij het wensten'* (respondent 2, personal interview, January 30, 2015).

Quote number six: *'Zij hebben die informatie ook nodig om goede beslissingen te nemen. Ook al heb je een computer bij de hand, je moet toch uiteindelijk ook weten wat de belangen zijn die in jouw land spelen om tot een goed besluit te komen'* (respondent 3, personal interview, February 2, 2015).

Quote number seven: *'De overheid luistert naar ons omdat wij ervoor zorgen dat wij bij de informatie die we aanreiken niet al te selectief in zijn in de zin van: alleen de dingen vertellen die ons uitkomen en die vervelend voor ons zijn verzwijgen. We geven een breed pakket van feitenmateriaal en leggen dan op grond van argumenten bij dat feitenmateriaal welke beleidskeuze onze voorkeur heeft. Maar door het gesprek zo breed te houden en niet alleen te zeggen: ik wil, ben je ook een geloofwaardige gesprekspartner en kun je klankborden'* (respondent 1, personal interview, January 30, 2015).

Quote number eight: *'Wij zijn de enige partij die die hele sector representeert. En dat geeft je ook een zekere autoriteit en die wordt ook gewaardeerd'* (respondent 11, personal interview, February 11, 2015).